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On October 22, 1997, President Clinton gave an eagerly 
anticipated speech at the National Geographic Society outlin-
ing the Administration's policy on climate change prior to the 
Kyoto negotiations on the U.N. Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change (UNFCCC). He said 
Today we have a clear responsibility and a golden opportunity 
to conquer one of the most important challenges of the 21st 
century -- the challenge of climate change -- with an environ-
mentally sound and economically strong strategy, to achieve 
meaningful reductions in greenhouse gases in the United 
States and throughout the industrialized and the developing 
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cles on climate change and advising a major company on interested in expanding its 
sustainable development business. She was a special assistant to the Assistant Secre-
tary of State for Oceans, Environment and Science from 2000-2001, where she focused 
on climate change issues. From 1994-2000, she worked as an attorney-adviser for the 
Department of Energy, serving as special assistant to the General Counsel from 1998-
2000. Amy holds a Bachelor of Arts degree from the Un!versity of Virginia in Econom-
ics and Spanish and a law degree from Harvard Law School. She would like to thank 
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world. It is a strategy that, if properly implemented, will cre-
ate a wealth of new opportunities for entrepreneurs at home, 
uphold our leadership abroad, and harness the power of free 
markets to free our planet from an unacceptable risk; a strat-
egy consistent with our commitment to reject false choices. 
Scientists don't yet know what the precise consequences [of 
increased greenhouse gas concentrations] will be. But we do 
know enough now to know that the Industrial Age has dra-
matically increased greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, 
where they take a century or more to dissipate; and that the 
process must be slowed, then stopped, then reduced if we 
want to continue our economic progress and preserve the 
quality of life in the United States and throughout our planet. 
We know what we have to do.! 
It was an ambitious statement, calling for the United 
States to take on a serious environmental challenge -climate 
change- and to use its ingenuity and the tools of the market in 
this effort. It also summarizes the approach the Clinton ad-
ministration wanted to take on climate change: listen to the 
scientists, and take action in a way that makes sound economic 
and environmental sense. 
What was the result of this approach? The Clinton ad-
ministration created numerous programs designed to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. It embarked upon innovative volun-
tary programs with industry, including electric utilities and the 
transportation and buildings sectors, and established the Cli-
mate Change Technology Initiative (CCTI), a $6.3 billion, 
five-year package of spending and tax incentives designed to 
stimulate the use of energy efficient technologies in building, 
industrial processes, vehicles, and power generation. It helped 
write the Kyoto Protocol, an agreement with binding emissions 
limitations for developed countries that included flexibility 
mechanisms to promote cost-effective action. 
However, the United States ended the decade failing to 
meet its voluntary commitment under the UNFCCC to reduce 
emissions by 2000 to 1990 levels. And, on the international 
front, despite the herculean efforts of U.S. negotiators, parties 
1 President Clinton, Address at National Geographic Society, paragraphs 9 and 13 
(Oct. 22, 1997), available at http://clinton6.nara.gov/1997/10/1997-10-22-remarks-on-
global-climate-change.html !hereinafter Clinton's National Geographic Speech). 
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were unable to reach an agreement in 2000 that would estab-
lish the rules and procedures for the Kyoto Protocol and thus 
set the stage for its ratification.2 
This mixed record underscores the difficulty of addressing 
climate change. It is not just an environmental issue, but an 
economic and social one. What will our economy in the future 
run on - natural gas, sun, hydrogen, nuclear or coal? How fast 
can we afford to change our infrastructure? What obligations 
do we have to the developing world, which will feels the most 
impact from climate change but is least equipped to deal with 
it? How do we get countries like India and China to grow in a 
manner that minimizes their growth in greenhouse gas emis-
sions? In addition, the issue of climate change was (and still is) 
perceived differently domestically than internationally, which 
left the Administration fighting a battle on the home front as 
well as abroad. 
This article describes the evolution of the Clinton Admini-
stration's policy on climate change and point to factors that 
influenced its deliberations. It focuses on the U.S. positions in 
international negotiations, international reaction to these posi-
tions, and domestic policies and politics that influenced these 
positions. More detailed analyses of certain issues - such as 
full descriptions of all the climate change-related activities un-
dertaken by the federal government, both abroad3 and at home4 
-- are beyond the scope of this article. 
2 This was accomplished in 2001 at COP-7 without U.S. participation. See 
http://www.unfccc.de/cop7 /documents/accords_draft. pdf. 
3 Between 1993 and 2000, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) 
invested over $1.4 billion for climate change-related mitigation activities abroad. 
ROGER S. BALLENTINE ET AL., MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE 
ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE CLINTON-GORE ADMINISTRATION (Jan. 2001) (on me with 
the author) !hereinafter ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF CLINTON ADMINISTRATION ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE]. These activities include activities that support the development and transfer 
of environmentally sound technologies and efforts to improve the ability of people to 
understand their vulnerability to climate change and increase people's ability to adapt 
to it. [d. In addition, descriptions of many bilateral and multilateral discussions re-
lated to climate change are not included. 
• These include the U.S. Global Change Research Program, which looks at the 
science of climate change, including adaptation and vulnerability assessments; numer-
ous Executive Orders (several executive orders to improve the energy efficiency and 
environmental performance of the federal government), see, e.g. Exec. Order No. 12902 
(Mar. 8, 1994); Exec. Order No. 13123 (June. 3, 1999); Exec. Order No. 13149 (Apr. 22, 
2000); an executive order to promote bio-energy, Exec. Order No. 13134 (1999); and 
rules and regulations promoting energy efficiency or other measures that would reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, such as the LandfIll Rule, available at 
3
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II. EVOLUTION OF CLINTON ADMINISTRATION POLICY 
A. 1993: BTU TAX AND THE CLIMATE CHANGE ACTION PLAN 
When William Jefferson Clinton entered office in January 
1993, he was the first Democratic president since Jimmy 
Carter; it had been 12 years since the Democrats had been in 
power at the White House. Thus, constituencies that tradi-
tionally support the Democratic party - unions, pro-choice 
groups, gun control advocates, and environmentalists - hoped 
for action on their pet causes.5 But the moderates within the 
party were more concerned about the economy, thus setting the 
stage for intra party tensions. 6 The Democrats also controlled 
the House and Senate,7 which meant (or so was thought) a fa-
vorable reception on the Hill for Administration legislative 
proposals. 
Environmental groups were especially optimistic.s The 
tenures of Presidents Reagan and Bush had been marked by 
fierce battles with environmental groups, over issues ranging 
from acid rain to the weakening of the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (hereinafter "EPA"). Vice President Albert Gore, 
Jr., on the other hand, had championed environmental causes 
throughout his tenure as a Senator and was a strong advocate 
of taking action on climate change.9 Clearly, a new administra-
http://www.epa.gov/ttniatw/landfill/landflpg.html(requiring large landfills to capture 
and combust their landfill gas emissions) and appliance standards for furnaces, water 
heaters, air conditioners, and refrigerators. 
• William Claiborne, Hopeful Interest Groups Ready Agendas for Clinton, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 10, 1992, at A12. 
• Thomas B. Edsall, Taking Credit, Placing Blame; Clinton's Task: Contain In-
traparty Tensions, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 1992, at A30. 
7 Ruth Marcus, Clinton Hosts Meeting with Top Hill Democrats, WASH. POST, Nov. 
16, 1992 (Clinton has his first post-election meeting with "Democratic congressional 
leadership . . . to 'talk about our obligations' now that Democrats will control both 
branches of government for the first time in 12 years"). 
8 See, e.g., Colman McCarthy, Gore's Politics Are Ever Green, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 
1992, at D20 (the League of Conservation Voters calls Al Gore "an environmental Paul 
Revere" because he sees and acts on environmental problems early on). 
• See generally AL GORE, EARTH IN THE BALANCE (1992). See also McCarthy; supra 
note 8 (noting that the League of Conservation Voters marked Gore as voting pro-
environment 73 percent of the time in 1991, 95 percent in 1989-90, and 50 percent in 
1987-88); Edward Walsh, Clinton Picks Gore to Form A 'New Generation' Ticket; Ten-
nessean Called Enviromnentalist and Family Man, WASH. POST, July 10, 1992, at Al 
(noting that "Gore is considered one of Washington's leading environmental advo-
cates"). 
4
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tion more friendly to environmental causes was now in town.lO 
Industry groups, on the other hand, feared the advent of new 
environmental regulations. l1 
The administration started with two bold moves on the en-
vironmental front. On February 17, 1993, President Clinton 
announced his administration's plan, which included a British 
Thermal Unit (BTU) tax - a tax based on the heat content of 
energy.12 Such a tax would have the effect of reducing emis-
sions in addition to raising revenue for the government to help 
eliminate the deficit. Secondly, on April 21, 1993, (Earth Day), 
Clinton announced that he would adopt a program to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions by 2000 to 1990 levels, in accordance 
with the UNFCCC.13 He called on his administration to "pro-
duce a cost-effective plan ... that can continue the trend of re-
duced emissions." 
The administration soon discovered that Congress had lit-
tle appetite for an energy tax, even one that would help reduce 
10 See, e.g., Tom Kenworth, Activist Ex-Aide to Gore Tapped to Direct EPA, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 12, 1992, at A10 (describing EPA nominee Carol Browner as an environ-
mentalist and activist). While George Bush had signed the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and 1992 amendments strengthening the 
Clean Air Act, he was convinced to do after tremendous lobbying from environmental 
groups. In addition, his administration's delegates pushed for voluntary rather than 
binding commitments in the UNFCCC. See J.W. Anderson, A History of Climate 
Change as a Political Issue, Resources for the Future policy paper, 11th paragraph, 
available at http://www.weathervane.rff.orglfeatures/feature005.html. "The American 
position prevailed over the Europeans', and the fmal Framework Convention commit-
ted the parties to little more than to make an effort, voluntary and unenforceable, to 
hold down emissions". Id. 
11 See, e.g., Tom Kenworth, Ranchers and Loggers are Fearful Landlord Clinton 
Will Raise the Rent; Pressure Building to Overhaul 1872 Mining Law, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 29, 1992, at A4; Daniel Southerland, Clinton Hasn't Convinced Some Captains of 
Industry; Executives See Democratic Candidates as Centrists but Worry About Gore, 
Advisers, Congress, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 1992: at G1 (reporting on meeting of National 
Associations of Manufacturers where participants expressed concern that Clinton as 
president would interfere with the economy); Tom Kenworthy, Confirmation Hearing 
Goes Well for Browner; EPA Designee Tries to Ease Business Concerns, WASH. POST, 
Jan. 12, 1993, at All (Browner tries to allay industry concerns, saying that she hopes 
her tenure will mark a "new era in communication between the EPA and America's 
business community"). 
12 President Clinton, Address to the Joint Sessions of Congress (Feb. 17, 1993), 
available at http://clinton6.nara.gov/1993/02l1993-02-17 -address-by-the-president-to-
the-joint-session-of-congress.html. Environmental groups helped the administration 
draft the proposal. See Thomas W. Lippman, Energy Tax Proposal Has 'Green' Tint; 
Environmentalists Back Plan They Helped Draft, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 1993, at Dl. 
13 White House Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President in Earth 
Day Speech (Apr. 21, 1993), available at http://clinton6.nara.gov/1993/04l1993-04-21-
presidents-remarks-in-earth-day-speech. html. 
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the deficit and promote environmentally responsible behavior. 
In the battle over Clinton's proposed budget,14 the proposal to 
enact a BTU tax failed to gain enough support and was re-
placed with a raise in the gasoline tax by 4.3 cents per gallon. 15 
Lesson learned: a broad-based carbon or energy tax was politi-
cally unacceptable in the United States, even with a Democ-
ratic Congress. 16 The administration would need to come up 
with other tools to address climate change. 
In October 1993, President Clinton announced his Climate 
Change Action Plan (CCAP),17 which consisted of over 50 new 
or expanded initiatives that the administration estimated 
would bring U.S. emissions back to 1990 levels by 2000. It in-
cluded energy efficiency standards, cooperative programs with 
industry, and a pilot program for joint implementation (U.S. 
investment in emissions reductions overseas).18 CCAP also 
,. See, e.g., Eric Pianin, Hill Derrwcrats Press for Entitlement Caps; White House 
Opposes Setting Limits on Mandatory Spending Programs, WASH. POST, May 18,1993, 
at Al (Clinton administration's tax and deficit reduction bill held up by demands from 
conservative and moderate Democrats); Eric Pianin and David Hilzenrath, Clinton 
Visits Congress to Press Economic Goals; Budget Negotiators Given 'Macro' Advice, 
WASH. POST, July 16, 1993, at A4 (Clinton goes to Hill to give broad advice as negotia-
tions begin on budget package; Clinton tells members they are on their own to work out 
specific differences, including on energy tax). 
1. David S. Hilzenrath, Politics Overtakes Policy in Energy Tax Debate, WASH. 
POST, July 20, 1993, at C1 (describing how proposal for broad-based energy tax was 
whittled down in the Senate to a 4.3 cents gasoline tax; the House had actually passed 
a BTU tax). 
1. Whether that was a correct lesson is another matter. An environmental group 
member who is familiar with the BTU tax campaign remarked that the administration 
tried to sell the tax as a deficit reduction measure, not as an environmental measure, 
so it is not clear that the American public wouldn't support a tax with environmental 
benefits. The administration also could have directed some of the revenue stream from 
a tax to powerful constituencies who might have lobbied Congress in support of the 
measure (for example, some of the revenue could have gone to Medicare or Social Secu-
rity). Interview with Alden Meyer, UCS .. 
17 President William J. Clinton and Vice President Albert Gore, Jr., The Climate 
Change Action Plan (Oct. 1993), available at http://www.gcrio.org/USCCAP/toc.html 
!hereinafter Climate Change Action Planl. 
18 For example, as part of its strategy of industry cooperation, the plan directed the 
Department of Energy to enter into voluntary agreements with electric utilities to 
reduce their emissions by 2000 to 1990 levels or limit emissions under strict perform-
ance standards (the program was called "Climate Challenge"). [d. at 22. Utilities were 
given great flexibility in their agreements to implement a portfolio of emissions reduc-
tions projects. [d. Other partnerships included the Partnership for a New Generation 
of Vehicles (PNGV), the goal of which was to "develop a revolutionary new class of 
clean, efficient passenger vehicles;" Climate Wise (technical assistance to manufactur-
ing industries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions); Industries of the Future (develop 
technologies to increase energy and resource efficiency in the most energy-intensive 
industries); and Energy Star@, a program for labeling energy efficient products. 
6
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committed the Administration to seeking $1.9 billion in new 
and redirected funding between 1994 and 2000 to implement 
the Plan,19 The administration also projected that investments 
by firms and individuals in energy saving equipment and tech-
nologies would yield significant cost savings over the long 
term.20 
The plan was denounced by many environmental advocacy 
organizations as inadequate since it did not propose any man-
datory emissions reductions.21 However, given that Congress 
would not accept a BTU tax, the administration likely assumed 
that Congress would not pass any proposal for mandatory 
emissions reductions, and thus decided to pursue voluntary 
programs.22 
Though Clinton's plan was designed in a way to minimize 
the need for legislative or regulatory action,23 the administra-
tion would still need Congressional approval for its funding 
commitments. This would become extremely difficult in 1995 
when the Republicans took control of the House of Representa-
tives and Senate. 
The change in the U.S. administration was reflected in the 
position the U.S. took in the international negotiations on the 
UNFCCC.24 The U.S. agreed that "science clearly suggests the 
ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF CLINTON ADMINISTRATION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 3. 
These programs lasted throughout the administration. 
19 [d. at ii. 
20 [d. at 7. Administration officials would often point to these cost savings as inde-
pendent reasons for implementing these measures. See, e.g., White House Office of the 
Press Secretary, Press Briefmg by Gene Sperling, Assistant to the President for Eco-
nomic Policy, Jim Steinberg, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security 
Affairs, and Leon Fuerth, National Security Advisor for the Vice President, (Dec. 11, 
1997), available at http://clinton6.nara.gov/1997/1211997-12-11-press-briefing-on-
kyoto.html [hereinafter White House Kyoto Press Conference]. ("[Greenhouse gas re-
duction measures] are measures to improve the efficiency of our economy. They are 
measures that we would want to take whether or not there is a global regime"). This 
became especially important following the Knollenberg Amendment, prohibiting offi-
cials from "pre-implementation" of Kyoto. 
21 See Gary Lee, Clinton Offers Package to 'Halt Global Warming', WASH. POST, 
Oct. 20, 1993, at A4 (citing criticisms by Greenpeace and Sierra Club of the voluntary 
nature of the program). 
22 See The Editorial Board, Cooling the Climate, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1993, at A30 
(when Congress killed the BTU tax, it left the President few options other than volun-
tary cooperation). 
23 Climate Change Action Plan, supra note 17, at 7. 
.. The U.S., along with 155 other nations, had signed the UNFCCC at the Earth 
Summit in 1992; it ratified the treaty in October 15, 1992. See also the UNFCCC 
Secretariat's ratification list, available at http://www.unfccc.de/resource/conv /ratlist. 
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need for precautionary action to limit the growth of emissions 
and concentrations of greenhouse gases"25 and thus "the fIrst 
step is to discuss the adequacy of commitments with delegates 
here."26 Its objectives at the Intergovernmental Negotiating 
Committee (INC) meetings27 were to "keep the momentum on 
all [the] issues" going.28 
B. 1994: GRIDLOCK AFrER MIDTERM CONGRESSIONAL 
ELECTIONS 
After raising expectations at INC-9 with its statement that 
current commitments under the UNFCCC are inadequate, the 
U.S. disappointed environmentalists by its "failure to make 
specific proposals at INC-10 [held in August 1994] on just how 
the treaty should be strengthened."29 The U.S. called for a new 
post-2000 aim without specifying what it should be, focused on 
joint implementation,30 and promoted new efforts by the more 
"advanced" developing countries to limit their greenhouse gas 
emissions. 31 The U.S. was criticized by the Climate Action 
Network (CAN) - a coalition of environmental groups that fol-
low and influence the negotiations - especially for its position 
on developing countries, since, as CAN noted, the U.S. had not 
made any new commitment to limit its own emissions.32 (Both 
environmental groups and industry groups, most notably the 
Global Climate Coalition,33 follow the climate negotiations 
closely.) 
pdf. The treaty entered into force on March 21, 1994. See also UNFCCC Secretariat 
Web site, at http://www.unfccc.de/resourceiconvkp.htmi. 
.. Climate Action Network, Changing Horses: Rafe Pomerance Interviewed, ECO 
(No.lO), Aug. 10, 1993, available at http://www.climatenetwork.org lecolEcol0_0893. 
html. 
26 Id. 
27 The International Negotiation Committee comprised the parties to the UNFCCC 
meeting prior to the entry into force of the UNFCCC. Id. 
26 Id. 
29 Climate Action Network, First Review of (In)adequacy of US Efforts at INC 10, 
ECO No.5, Aug. 31, 1994, available at http://www.climatenetwork.org lecolE5US_ 
Stance.html. 
30 See discussion of joint implementation infra . 
• 1 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 The Global Climate Coalition (GCC), which comprises companies opposed to 
mandatory greenhouse gas emissions reductions, has extensive contact with negotia-
tions from OPEC countries and considerable influence, much to chagrin of environ-
mental groups. CAN reportedly retrieved talking points prepared by one of the GCC 
8
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In November, Congressional elections turned the House 
and Senate over to the Republicans; Republicans would control 
both houses for the first time since the 1950s.34 Republicans 
could now focus on their own agenda - in particular, the so-
called "Contract with America"35 -- rather than react to the 
President's legislative proposals. The Clinton administration 
would now have to win over Republicans in order to pass any 
legislation on environmental matters.36 And Clinton's foreign 
policy would face a tough critic in the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee: Jesse Helms.37 According to former Acting Assis-
tant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environ-
mental and Scientific Mfairs Melinda Kimble, because of the 
Republican control of Congress, the administration had to 
"build consensus from the ground up on every issue," not just 
climate. 38 It was thus hard to move forward on any issue, let 
alone climate, resulting in total gridlock.39 
representatives for use by Kuwait. Climate Action Network, The Global Climate Coali-
tion - Bad Behavior, ECO, Vol. 88 No.6, Feb. 17, 1995, available at 
http://www.climatenetwork.org/eco/6.11.gcc.html (decrying the "blatant tactics" of a 
GCC representative of "dashing off anonymous interventions and sending them via 
runners to representatives of his puppet states" during the discussion of adequacy of 
commitments). 
34 Dan Balz, A Historic Republican Triumph: GOP Captures Congress; Party Con-
trols Both Houses for First Time Since '50s, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 1994, at AI. 
.. Hobart Rowen, Reverse Gridlock?, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 1994, at A25 (expressing 
concern that the Republican control of Congress and its focus on the Contract with 
America would lead to "gridlock"). Businesses looked forward to a deregulatory 
agenda. Mike Mills and Frank Swoboda, After the Rout, It's a New Landscape for Cor-
porate America; Deregulators See Their Chance to Set the Agenda in Congress, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 10,1994, at B13. 
36 Though many environmental laws had not had moved forward even with Democ-
rats in control of Congress. See Tom Kenworthy and Gary Lee, Environmental Bills 
Still Due; Congress May Quit Without Sending Clinton a Single Major Measure, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 16, 1994, at A4 (Sierra Club political director calls the 103'" Congress "the 
worst environmental Congress since the first Earth Day in 1970;" revisions of clean 
water, safe drinking water, endangered species, solid waste, the Superfund program, 
and fisheries management laws stalled). 
37 John M. Goshko, U.S. Policy Faces Review By Helms; State Dept. Nemesis to Flex 
Muscle as Chairman of Foreign Relations, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 1994, at A1. 
3B Interview with Melinda Kimble, former Acting Assistant Secretary of State for 
Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (Oct. 4, 2001) [hereinaf-
ter Kimble Interview]. Prior to becoming Acting Assistant Secretary in October of 
1997, Kimble served in the Bureau of International Organizations at the Department 
of State. 
39 [d. The change in Congress also affected regulatory agencies. See Cindy Skrzy-
cki, New Conservative Climate Chills Agencies' Activism, WASH. POST, Feb. 18,1996, at 
Al (describing how pressure from Congressional Republicans, budget cutbacks and the 
Clinton administration's efforts to cut red tape had changed how agencies operate, 
9
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C. 1995: INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS AND U.S. CLIMATE 
BUDGET REDUCTIONS 
In March of 1995, international negotiators met in Berlin, 
Germany, for the fIrst Conference of the Parties (COP-I) to the 
UNFCCC to assess progress on meeting the goals of the Con-
vention.40 In particular, the parties reviewed implementation 
of Articles 4.2(a) and (b) of the Convention, which required An-
nex I Parties41 to "adopt national policies and take correspond-
ing measures on the mitigation of climate change" by limiting 
emissions of greenhouse gases and enhancing sinks,42 and to 
report on these policies and measures, as well as on projected 
emissions.43 The Conference of the Parties (COP) concluded in 
Decision lICP.l that "these subparagraphs are not adequate," 
and thus agreed to set up a process with the aim of strengthen-
ing these commitments through the adoption of a protocol or 
other legal instrument.44 
Most notably, the parties at COP-l agreed to embark upon 
a process to draft a legal instrument setting emissions reduc-
tions for Annex I parties. 45 Furthermore, there would be no 
new commitments for developing-country parties.46 At the 
time, the latter was not a controversial proposition: one of the 
making them less likely to aggressively pursue violators or enact regulations). 
'" The powers and duties of the Conference of the Parties are set out in Article 7 of 
the UNFCCC. In particular, the Conference of the Parties "shall make, within its 
mandate, the decisions necessary to promote the effective implementation of the Con-
vention." UNFCCC, art. 7.2, available at http://www.unfccc.de. The INC met for the 
last time prior to COP-1 in February 1995 (INC-10). 
41 Parties that have made voluntary commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions to 1990 levels by 2000. They include the 24 original members of the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (including the U.S.), the European Union, 
and 14 countries with economies in transition (Croatia, Liechtenstein, Monaco and 
Slovenia joined at COP-3, and the Czech Republic and Slovakia replaced Czechoslova-
kia). United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change glossary, available at 
http://www.unfccc.de/siteinfo/glossary .html. 
42 "'Sink' means any process, activity or mechanism which removes a greenhouse 
gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas from the atmosphere." UNFCCC, art. 
1(8), available at http://www.unfccc.de. An example of a sink is a forest, because trees 
absorb carbon dioxide as they grow. 
.. [d. at arts. 4.2(a), (b). 
.. Report of the Conference of the Parties on its First Session, Held at Berlin from 
March 28 to April 7,1995, Addendum, Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the 
Parties at its First Session Decision, I/CP.I, FCCC/CP/1995nIAdd.l, at preamble, 
available at http://unfccc.intlresource/cop1.html. [hereinafter COP-I Report, Part Two]. 
.. [d. at art. 2(a)(1). 
.. [d. at art. 2(a)(2). 
10
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principles of the UNFCCC, which the U.S. had ratified, stated 
that "the developed country Parties should take the lead in 
combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof."47 
In a victory for the United States, the parties also agreed 
to "establish a pilot phase for activities implemented jointly 
among Annex I Parties and, on a voluntary basis, with non-
Annex I Parties that so request."48 "Activities implemented 
jointly," or "joint implementation," refers to emissions reduc-
tions, emissions avoidance, or sequestration projects that occur 
in one country but are sponsored by another, so that the spon-
soring country would presumably get some or all credit from 
the project under a credit regime.49 Under Secretary for Global 
Affairs Timothy Wirth called joint implementation the "signa-
ture item" of the conference.50 
The so-called "Berlin Mandate" - in particular, the agree-
ment of "developed countries go first" - would come to haunt 
the U.S. delegation in future negotiations because of domestic 
concerns about the trade implications of excluding China, India 
and Brazil from emissions reduction commitments. So, why 
did the United States agree to this? Senior officials in the gov-
ernment believed that the only way to move the process for-
ward was to agree that the developed countries would reach an 
agreement fIrst.51 The U.S.'s main objective in Berlin was to 
"keep the EU from pinning us [the U.S.] down on a target and 
to save JI [joint implementation]."52 The climate issue did not 
receive high-level attention at agencies other than the Depart-
ment of State, though when representatives of the economic 
agencies weighed in, they expressed concern about compromis-
" UNFCCC, art. 3.1, available at http:tlwww.unfccc.de . 
.. COP-1 Report, Part Two, supra note 44, at Decision 5tCP.1, art. 1. 
•• These projects could involve collaborations between investors in Annex I coun-
tries and developing countries, or among Annex I countries alone. The Kyoto Protocol 
established a mechanism called "joint implementation" whereby Annex I parties can 
receive "emission reduction units· for projects it invests in that are in other Annex I 
parties (per Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol). Thus, projects by investors in Annex I 
parties in developing countries began to be referred to "activities implemented jointly" 
(AIJ). AIJ projects operate under a pilot phase that expired in 2000. 
.. Referring to U.N. Climate Conference held in Berlin (Apr. 13, 1995), available at 
http://www.facts.com/cdl95059990.htm . 
• , Kimble Interview, supra note 38; Interview with Rafe Pomerance, former Deputy 
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ing current economic growth to deal with a 100-year problem.53 
Thus, at the usual interagency meetings that precede any ma-
jor international negotiations, people may not have focused on 
the implications of developed countries agreeing to go first; 
there were no targets and timetables, so lots of flexibility re-
mained. However, U.S. career-staff at the Berlin negotiations 
realized that the Berlin Mandate would be ''bad news on the 
Hill," but at this point, Congress was not focusing on the inter-
national climate change negotiations or U.S. positions.54 
Agreeing to the Berlin mandate was a "tactical step to keep the 
process moving."55 
As noted above, the Clinton administration was unable to 
focus on climate change in its legislative agenda because it was 
instead forced to battle with Congress over the federal budget. 
Republicans in control of Congress pursued a legislative 
agenda at odds with the Clinton administration, cutting Medi-
caid, Medicare, education spending, and taxes,56 in addition to 
attempting to strip back environmental regulatory protections, 
and slashing spending on energy efficiency and renewable en-
ergy programs57 and CCAP.58 In fact, relations degraded to 
such an extent that on November 14th, over a month into Fiscal 
Year 1996, parts of the government were shut down for about 
three weeks because appropriations had not been authorized. 59 
53 Kimble Interview, supra note 38. 
MId . 
.. Id. 
156 R.H. Melton, Clinton Seeks Budget Cooperation, WASH. POST, June 29, 1995, at 
A9 (Clinton complained that the balanced budget plan "cuts too deeply into Medicare, 
Medicaid, education and training while cutting taxes "for too many who don't need it") . 
., Gary Lee, 'Fuelish' Report Outlines Threat to Jobs, Efficiency Gains, WASH. 
POST, June 2, 1995, at A21 (proposed congressional cuts to federal energy efficiency 
and renewable energy spending decried by environmental groups and the Department 
of Energy); Dan Morgan, House Panel Backs Big Cuts For Some Energy Research, 
WASH. POST, June 14, 1995, at A20 (House appropriations subcommittee proposes deep 
cuts for solar power research), 
... Dan Morgan, Senate Panel Votes to Restore Funds for Housing, EPA Programs, 
WASH. POST, Sept, 12, 1995, at A4, (noting Senate Appropriations Subcommittee pro-
posed cuts in funding for CCAP), 
59 Ann Devroy, Workers Go Home; Talks Go Nowhere; Clinton, GOP at Impasse on 
Budget, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 1995, at Al (hundreds of thousands of federal workers 
will stay home for a second day today as Congress and the President fail to find a solu-
tion to the budget stalemate); Eric Pianin and John F, Harris, Clinton Signs Measures 
to Halt Shutdown, WASH, POST, Jan, 6, 1996, at AI. 
12
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 4 [2002], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol32/iss4/3
2002] CLINTON'S CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY 427 
In December of 1995, the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change (IPCC)60 released a draft of its so-called Second 
Assessment Report (SAR) 61. This consensus report concluded, 
in its most publicized finding that "the balance of evidence sug-
gests that there is a discernible human influence on global cli-
mate."62 Climate scientists in the United Kingdom issued a 
report that 1995 was the hottest year on record.63 
D. 1996: COP-2 AND THE QUESTION OF BINDING EMISSIONS 
LIMITS 
With the release of the SAR, pressure intensified for nego-
tiators to make progress at COP-2, which was scheduled for 
July 1996 in Geneva, Switzerland. Assistant Secretary of State 
for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific M-
fairs, Eileen Claussen, chaired a group of assistant secretaries 
60 The !pcc was established in 1998 by the United Nations Environment Program 
(UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) to investigate global 
warming by reviewing existing scientific data and report its findings. The IPCC con-
sists of over 2,000 scientific and technical experts from around the world. It has three 
Working Groups: one group "assesses the scientific aspects of the climate system and 
climate change," another group "addresses the vulnerability of socio-economic and 
natural systems to climate change, negative and positive consequences of climate 
change, and options for adapting to it," and the third group "assesses options for limit-
ing greenhouse gas emissions and otherwise mitigating climate change." See 
http://WWW.ipcc.ch/aboutiabout.htm. The !PCC's Assessment Reports consists of re-
ports from each of the three Working Groups and a synthesis report . 
• , Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Second Assessment Report (De-
cember 1995) (SAR). The !PCC Second Assessment Synthesis of Scientific and Techni-
cal Information, along with the Summaries for Policymakers of the three Working 
Groups, constitute the SAR. 1d. at vii. The First Assessment Report was released in 
1990. 
.. 1d. at 22. The report also reported that, for a mid-range emissions scenario, 
models projected an increase in global mean surface air temperature relative to 1990 of 
about 2°C by 2100. 1d. at 23. This was lower by one-third than the "best estimate' in 
1990, due mainly to decreased emissions, increased sulfate aerosols, which cool the 
atmosphere, and a better understanding of the carbon cycle. Id. Nevertheless, the 
SAR's prognosis was still bleak: predicted deleterious impacts of climate change in-
clude, inter alia, loss of habitat, sea level rise, loss of forest, desertification, and loss of 
species. 1d. at 28-35. The SAR also noted that climate systems may be "non-linear," 
meaning that we may see unexpected behavior once some threshold is reached that 
"switches" a system on or off. 1d. at 24. 
63 Nick Nutall, Hotter-than-ever World Adds to Fear of Climate Change, THE TIMES 
OF LoNDON, Jan. 6, 1996; Boyce Rensberger, What's Hot, What's Not, WASH. POST, Jan. 
8, 1996, at A2 (noting the release the previous week of a preliminary report by the 
Climatic Research Unit at the University of East Anglia in England saying that the 
climate in 1995 was the warmest in a record that goes back more than a century, but 
noting that other scientists disagreed with that finding). 
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from various U.S. agencies that met to discuss climate policy. 
According to former senior officials in the government, the de-
cision that the U.S. would agree at COP-2 to take on a binding 
target was vetted at this assistant secretary level group, with 
White House input. 64 "The implications [of taking on a binding 
target] were not fully clear at the time," according to former 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Environment Rafe 
Pomerance.65 "We needed a target in order to make emissions 
trading work"66 and the U.S. clearly and strongly supported 
flexibility mechanisms such as emissions trading. According to 
Pomerance, the economic agencies did not object, and the 
White House cleared Wirth's speech announcing the U.S. deci-
sion.67 
At COP-2, Under Secretary for Global Mfairs Timothy 
Wirth announced that the United States would support a le-
gally binding agreement with emissions limitations if other 
countries would do SO.68 This was the first time the U.S. had 
publicly expressed support for a legally binding agreement.69 
As Wirth said to The New York Times, "This is a big deal ... 
Saying that we want to have a target that is binding is a clear 
indication that the United States is very serious about taking 
steps and leading the rest of the world."70 Wirth's statement 
.. Interview with David Gardiner, former Director of the White House Climate 
Change Task Force (Aug. 31,2001) [hereinafter Gardiner Interview]; Pomerance Inter-
view, supra note 51; Kimble Interview, supra note 38. 
M Pomerance Interview, supra note 5l. 
66 [d. 
67 [d. 
66 Under Secretary for Global Affairs Timothy E. Wirth, Address before the Second 
Conference of the parties Framework Convention on Climate Change, Geneva, Switzer-
land (July 17, 1996), available at http://www.state.govlwww/globaVoes/960717.html 
[hereinafter Wirth COP-2 Statement] . 
.. See INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, EARTH 
NEGOTIATIONS BULLETIN: A SUMMARY REPORT ON THE SECOND CONFERENCE OF THE 
PARTIES TO THE FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 1, Vol. 12, No. 38 (July 
22, 1996) [hereinafter ENB REPORT ON COP-2] ("The Conference also saw a significant 
shift in position by the US, which for the fIrst time supported a legally binding agree-
ment to fulfIll the Berlin Mandate"). [d. At a negotiating session of the Intergovern-
mental Negotiating Committee (which preceded the Conference of the Parties, prior to 
entry into force of the Convention), the U.S. had "said only that it supported the need 
to consider 'new aims' through negotiations under the SBI for the post-2000 period, 
generally avoiding the word 'protocol.'" INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT, EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULLETIN: A SUMMARY REPORT ON THE FIRST 
CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
10, (Vol. 12, No. 21) April 10, 1995 [hereinafter ENB REPORT ON COP-I]. 
70 John H. Cushman, Jr., U.S. Will Seek Pact on Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES, July 
14
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stressed that "science calls upon us to take urgent action; the 
IPCC report is the best science that we have, and we should 
use it."71 
While much of the press (and delegates' attention) was fo-
cused on the United States' public support for binding emis-
sions limits, 72 Wirth's statement also laid out principles that 
the U.S. believed should underlie the negotiations of an agree-
ment for binding emissions limits and other objectives the U.S. 
would seek. These principles and objectives are notable be-
cause they remained consistent throughout the rest of the ten-
ure of the Administration. 
First, Wirth emphasized that the negotiations must focus 
on outcomes that are "real and achievable."73 By this, Wirth 
meant that any targets must be ones that countries could be 
expected to meet, rather than overly ambitious targets doomed 
to failure. 74 Secondly, the U.S. would "continue to seek market-
based solutions that were flexible and cost-effective."75 Fur-
thermore, Wirth's statement stressed that "it is the target that 
should be binding, not the individual measures, thus allowing 
maximum flexibility in implementation."76 Third, the U.S. be-
lieved that any agreement should "lay the foundation for con-
tinuing progress by all nations in the future ... [because] all 
nations - developed and developing - must contribute to the 
solution to this challenge."77 The United States was committed 
to ensuring that all countries - developed and developing -
17,1996. 
71 Wirth COP-2 Statement, supra note 68, para. 2. 
72 [d. (Comments by the Global Climate Coalition and Environmental Defense Fund 
focus on the binding target); Karen Capoor and Annie Petsonk, U.S. Acts on Global 
Warming at Geneva, ENVTL DEF. FUND NEWSL, Vol. XXVII, No.5 (Sept. 1996), avail-
able at http://www.edf.org/pubs/Newsletter/1996/Sep/h.,gwarm.html. "The U.S. state-
ment set off a ripple effect around the world. Surprised delegates sent frantic cables to 
capitals for further instructions .. " [d. 
13 Wirth COP-2 Statement, supra note 68, para. 11. 
,. For example, the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) group at a previous 
negotiating session had proposed a draft protocol requiring Annex I Parties to the 
protocol to reduce their C02 emissions by 2005 to a level of at least twenty percent 
below that of 1990. See ENB REPORT ON COP-I, supra note 70, at 10. 
7' [d. at para. 12. 
76 [d. at para. 21. The European Union, on the other hand, sought a requirement 
that governments mandate specific emission reduction initiatives. See EARTH 
NEGOTIATIONS BULLETIN, SUMMARY OF THE SECOND CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO 
THE FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE: 8 - 19 JULY 1996 7, Vol. 12, No. 
38 (July 22, 1996). 
77 [d. at para. 13. 
15
Royden: Clinton's Climate Change Policy
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2002
430 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:4 
"take steps to limit emissions, consistent with the mandate 
agreed upon last year in Berlin."78 
Thus, while the U.S. announced its readiness to embrace a 
mandatory target, Wirth's statement made clear that the U.S. 
sought maximum flexibility in implementation, targets that 
were real and achievable, and some involvement by developing 
countries to ensure that they took steps to limit emissions as 
well. The U.S. consistently stuck to these positions in subse-
quent negotiations. 
The statement by Wirth paved the way for the negotiators 
to agree to the so-called "Geneva Declaration on Climate 
Change."79 In this Declaration, ministers and other heads of 
delegations instructed their representatives "to accelerate ne-
gotiations on the text of a legally-binding protocol or another 
legal instrument to be completed in due time for adoption" at 
COP-3.80 The agreement should contain for Annex I parties 
"quantified legally-binding objectives for emission limitations 
and significant overall reductions within specified time-
frames,"81 and commitments for Annex I parties regarding poli-
cies and measures.82 Regarding developing countries, the Dec-
laration welcomed their efforts to implement the Convention 
and make their initial communications,83 and called upon the 
Global Environmental Facility84 to provide support to them,85 
recognizing that continued advancement by developing coun-
tries in meeting their commitments depended upon action by 
78 Id. at para. 19. 
,. Capoor and Petsonk, supra note 72. This declaration was included in an Annex 
to the Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Second Session, Held at Geneva 
From 8 to 19 July 1996, Addendum: Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the 
Parties at its Second Session, Document FCCC/CP/1996/15/Add.1 [hereinafter COP-2 
Report, Part Twol. 
80 Id. at 73 (paragraph 8 ofthe Geneva Declaration). 
81 Id. 
82 Id. This commitment to policies and measures, pushed by the European Union, 
was vague enough to be acceptable to the United States since it did not specify what 
the commitments should be. 
83 Id. (paragraph 9 of the Geneva Declaration). 
.. The multibillion-dollar Global Environmental Facility (GEF) was established in 
1990 by the World Bank, U.N. Environment Program and U.N. Development Program. 
It operates the Convention's "fmancial mechanism" on an interim basis and funds 
developing country projects that have global climate change benefits. United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change Secretariat- Glossary of Climate Change 
Acronyms and Jargon, available at http://www.unfccc.de/siteinfo/glossary.html. 
.. Id. 
16
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Annex II parties,86 in particular access to financial resources 
and environmentally-sound technology.87 
The U.S. announcement at COP-2 received widespread at-
tention.88 While environmental groups were pleased with the 
U.S. announcement at COP-2, industry groups opposed any 
binding emissions limitations and were surprised by the U.S. 
proposal. 89 Given this controversy, the White House tasked 
Katie McGinty, Council on Environmental Quality chairman, 
Gene Sperling of the National Economic Council, and Jim 
Steinberg of the National Security Council to head up policy-
making on climate change and increase coordination among 
agencies in this policymaking process. 90 While the White 
House had been involved in the policy meetings prior to COP-2, 
after COP-2 the White House led the climate change policy-
making process. 
1996 was a Presidential election year, and President Clin-
ton defeated challengers Robert Dole and Ross Perot to win a 
second term in office. 91 In addition, while the House and Sen-
ate remained in Republican control, their margin of control de-
creased.92 President Clinton had successfully used his battles 
with Congress over the budget, especially a shutdown of the 
federal government at the end of 1995 and beginning of 1996, 
to hammer Republicans for creating gridlock in the govern-
ment.93 With a more favorable balance in the Congress, and 
.. Annex II parties are Annex I parties (developed countries) but not the countries 
with economies in transition. 
87 COP-2 Report, Part Two, supra note 79 (paragraph 10 of the Geneva Declara-
tion). 
'" Gary Lee, U.S. Urges Binding Accord on Global Warming, WASH. POST, July 18, 
1996, at A3; Peter Capella, Gummer Sounds Alarm Bells on Global Warming, THE 
TIMES OF LONDON, July 18, 1996 (noting Wirth's announcement for a realistic but 
binding target); Cushman, supra note 70. 
.. Lee, supra note 88. (The Edison Electric Institute, a trade association for the 
electric power industry, claims mandatory measures would have severe repercussions 
for the U.S. economy and that voluntary reductions are working; Environmental De-
fense Fund praises proposal). 
00 Gardiner Interview, supra note 64 . 
• , Dan Balz, Clinton Wins by Wide Margin; GOP Holds Control of Congress; First 
Democrat Since FDR to Get 2nd Term, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 1996, at AI. 
92 [d. 
93 See, e.g., Eric Pianin and John F. Harris, Clinton Signs Measures to Halt Shut-
down, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 1996, at Al (many Congressional Republicans acknowledge 
that shutdown had become political liability for them). 
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some wins under its belt, the administration could perhaps feel 
. more confident about achieving its goals.94 
E. 1997: BINDING TARGETS, TIMETABLES AND THE KyOTO 
PROTOCOL 
In 1997, the United States government officials involved in 
climate change focused on the proposal the U.S. would present 
at COP·3, which would take place in Kyoto, Japan. The White 
House Climate Change Task Force, headed by Todd Stern, was 
created in early 1997 to provide support for this process.95 
Stern quickly realized that the administration also needed to 
communicate better its climate change strategy to constituen· 
cies and educate the public about the climate change issue, so 
public communication and constituency outreach also became a 
key activity of the Task Force.96 The administration reached 
out to stakeholders: the State Department met with industry 
and environmental groups,97 and members of the White House 
Climate Change Task Force talked to environmental groups, 
labor groups and industry groups, including the power sector.98 
.. But see, Thomas B. Edsall and Mario A. Brossard, Clashing Coalitions Produce 
Split in Government Power; Religion, Marital Status Among New Predictors of Parti-
sanship, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 1996, at Al (arguing that two bitterly opposed voting 
coalitions brought the President and Republicans to power, so battles on the Hill will 
continue). 
.. Id. Todd Stern was formally tapped by the President to coordinate the Admini-
stration's efforts on climate change in March of 1998, but he began playing a major role 
in the Administration on climate change beginning in July 1997. See White House 
Office of Press Secretary, President Clinton N ames Todd Stern to Coordinate Climate 
Change Effort, (Mar. 11, 1998), available at http://clinton6.nara.gov/1998/03/1998-03-
II-todd-stern-named-to-coordinate-climate-change-effort.htm1 (announcing Stern's 
appointment and also noting the role Stern has played on climate change from July 
1997). 
00 Gardiner Interview, supra note 64. For example, Stern organized an event at the 
White House with weathercasters to discuss climate change with the President and 
Vice President. See White House Office of the Vice President, Remarks by Vice Presi-
dent Ai Gore to Weather Forecasters on Global Climate Change, (Oct. 1, 1997), avail-
able at http://clinton6.nara.gov/1997/10/1997-10-01-vp-remarks-on-global-climate-
change.html. This is not to say that the government had not consulted with outside 
stakeholders prior to the creation of the Task Force; the Department of State had an 
ongoing dialogue with industry and environmental groups. Pomerance Interview, su-
pra, note 51. 
97 Including in particular the National Association of Manufacturers and the Cli-
mate Action Network. Milo Mason, Interview with Stuart E. Eizenstat, 13 NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENV'T 2, Fall 1998), at 432. 
.. Id. 
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In addition to reaching out to domestic constituencies, the 
U.S. continued its discussions with other countries to educate 
them on the U.S.'s positions and win allies.99 For example, 
throughout the year, Under Secretary of Global Mfairs Wirth 
had a series of sessions in Europe and Saudi Arabia, as well as 
with key ministers from Japan, Australia, Canada, and New 
Zealand. lOo Other senior officials traveled to Latin America 
and Asia to discuss U.S. positions. lOi The U.S. found the "most 
extensive areas of common ground with Australia, Canada, 
Japan and New Zealand," as well as support from Russia and 
the Eastern European countries.102 
However, the U.S. and the European Union were at 
odds. 103 In March of 1997, the European Union announced its 
99 As in most international negotiations, coalitions of countries form to promote 
common interests. JUSSCANNZ comprised the United States, Switzerland, Canada, 
Australia, Norway and New Zealand. After Kyoto, the Umbrella Group, which in-
cluded the JUSSCANNZ members plus Austria, Iceland, Russia and Ukraine, was the 
main coalition that the U.S. participated in. In the Umbrella Group, the U.S. found 
allies for its positions on emissions trading (among other issues). To simplify the dis-
cussion in this article, I will refer only to the U.S. position rather than the 
JUSSCANNZ or Umbrella Group position, because they were not always the same. 
The other main negotiating groups are the EU and the G-77/China group. See Marina 
Cazorla, Climate Talk: Who's Who? International Negotiating Groups, Aug. 12, 1999, 
available at http://www.weathervane.rif.org/negtable/negtable01.html. 
100 Under Secretary of Global Affairs Timothy Wirth, Statement before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, Export 
and Trade Promotion (Oct. 9, 1997), at para. 6, available at http://www.state.gov/www 
/global/oes/971009tw.html [hereinafter Wirth Testimony]. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at para. 7. 
103 Because the EU-US dynamic plays such a large role in the international negotia-
tions, it is worthwhile to briefly explore the tensions between these two negotiating 
units. Former Acting Assistant Secretary for Oceans and International Environmental 
and Scientific Mfairs for the Department of state, Melinda Kimble, notes several dif-
ferences. First, the Europeans are much more willing to accept tax and regulatory 
measures to restrict emissions. Their tax burden is high already - they tax gasoline 
significantly more than it is taxed in the U.S., for example. They also receive more 
services from their governments, so they accept these high taxes, but U.S. citizens are 
not tax-friendly (see BTU tax discussion, supra). In addition, the European Union and 
its member countries tend to set "aspirational standards" they know their firms can't 
achieve, and these standards are not enforced strictly; it is assumed it will take time 
for firms to adopt. In the U.S., on the other hand, environmental standards are en-
forced through litigation and penalties. Thus, the Europeans tend to push for higher 
"aspirational" emissions reductions. Kimble also claims that Europeans view climate 
change as a way of increasing energy costs in the U.S. and thus making the European 
economy more competitive with the American economy. This would explain why the 
Europeans push for a requirement that most emissions reductions be achieved domes-
tically. Furthermore, the EU political apparatus differs significantly from the U.S. It 
is beyond the scope of this article to elucidate all the differences, but one key one is 
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proposal for a treaty in Kyoto: the proposal called for a reduc-
tion by all industrialized countries of fifteen percent from 1990 
levels by 2010 for the three major greenhouse gases - C02, 
methane and nitrous oxide. l04 The U.S. considered this target 
"unrealistic and unachievable."105 In addition, the EU proposed 
that its member countries be treated as a ''bubble,'' and that a 
target be set for the entire EU to meet, rather than individual 
countries. 106 The EU would then decide for itself what emis-
sions reductions - or increases - its member countries would 
need to meet. The U.S. objected to ''bubbling'' on various 
grounds, including how compliance would be addressed (who 
would be held accountable for a failure to meet the target) and 
how new EU members would be treated.l°7 Despite these con-
cerns, the EU announcement put tremendous pressure on the 
U.S. to come up with its own plan.l08 
Additional pressure, this time at a personal and high level, 
came in June, at the meeting of the major industrial powers in 
Denver for the G-8 Summit. European leaders approached 
Clinton and began to "press [him] personally and publicly" on 
global warming. l09 French President Chirac even went so far 
as to call Americans "great polluters," saying "they generate 
three times as much C02 per capita as the French do."llo While 
Clinton agreed that global warming was a serious issue, he did 
not indicate what specific numbers for emissions limitations 
the U.S. would accept. lll One consequence of the European 
that EU member countries send their environment ministers to climate change nego-
tiations, and these ministers can be much "greener" than the rest of the government 
and may present positions that may not be supported by the economics or fmance min-
istries. Finally, Europeans are very concerned about their climate being radically 
affected by climate change, such as the Gulf Stream no longer warming Europe. See 
also Kimble Interview, supra note 3B. 
11M Anderson, supra note 10, at para. 16. 
1" Wirth Testimony, supra note 100, at para. B. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at para. 9. 
108 It also created an "unstoppable momentum" towards an agreement with a below 
1990 emissions target, according to Pomerance. Pomerance Interview, supra note 51. 
109 J.W. Anderson, Climate Change, Clinton and Kyoto: The Negotiations ouer Global 





Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 4 [2002], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol32/iss4/3
2002] CLINTON'S CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY. 435 
leaders' approaching Clinton was increased attention to the 
issue of climate change by the President himself.ll2 
But, complicating U.S. policy development, on July 25, 
1997, the U.S. Senate - which must provide its advice and con-
sent regarding ratification of any treaty - passed a resolution 
directing the President not to sign any emissions reduction 
agreement that did not also require the developing countries to 
reduce or limit emissions. By a vote of 95-0, the Senate passed 
the Byrd-Hagel Resolution declaring that it was the sense of 
the Senate that the U.S. should not sign any protocol that (A) 
mandated new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions "unless the protocol or other agreement also man-
dates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties 
within the same compliance period, or (B) would result in seri-
ous harm to the economy of the United States ... "113 While 
intense lobbying by energy industry officials prompted this 
resolution, Congress was also concerned about the trade impli-
cations of the U.S. being held to emissions reductions or limits 
but not some of its major trade competitors - namely China 
and India.1l4 
The Byrd-Hagel Resolution directly contradicted the Berlin 
Mandate agreed upon at COP-1: developed countries, which 
have emitted the vast majority of greenhouse gas emissions 
already in the atmosphere, should take the first steps in reduc-
'12 For example, both President Clinton and Vice President Gore participated in a 
White House Conference on Climate Change at Georgetown University on October 6, 
1997. The President and Vice President engaged in a lively discussion with scientists 
about the causes of global warming, its impacts, and whether it had started. See White 
House Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President During Presentations at 
the White House Conference on Climate Change (Oct. 6, 1997), available at 
http://clinton6.nara.gov/1997 110/1997 -10-06-president-remarks-during-climate-change-
conference.html. The President's State of the Union address in January 1998 called 
global warming "our overriding environmental challenge." White House Office of the 
Press Secretary, State of the Union Address by the President, (Jan. 28, 1998), available 
at http://clinton6.nara.gov/1998101l1998-01-27-state-of-the-union-address-by-the-pres 
ident.html. While the Clinton administration had from the beginning sought to take 
action on climate change, the President was distracted from this effort by, for example, 
his battles with Congress over the budget, especially following the Congressional take-
over by the Republicans in 1995, and the campaign to win reelection in 1996. 
"3 S. Res. 98, 105th Congo (1997) (enacted) [hereinafter the Byrd-Hagel Resolution]. 
The legal effect of this resolution is unclear. The Constitution provides that the Presi-
dent has the power to make treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate, pro-
vided two-thirds of those present concur. Article II, section 2. 
'14 Anderson, supra note 109, at para. 35. 
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ing emissions. Though the United States had pushed for de-
veloping country participation in international negotiations, 115 
now it appeared that this participation was a requirement for 
ratification. Not only would the Clinton administration need to 
consider what emissions limitations it could accept, then, it 
also had to decide how to reconcile two conflicting mandates 
regarding developing countries, one from U.S. Congress and 
the other from the rest of the world. 116 The resolution also ex-
pressed concern about the impact of emissions limitations on 
the U.S. economy. But as the richest country in the world, un-
doubtedly the U.S. would have a hard time convincing other 
countries it could not afford to take action. This conflict in pri-
orities and perception between international and domestic con-
stituencies would complicate the U.S. policy making process 
and international negotiations for the rest of the administra-
tion's tenure,117 "Byrd-Hagel polarized the relationship be-
tween the administration and Congress on climate change," 
according to Former Acting Assistant Secretary of State for 
Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Mfairs 
Melinda Kimble. 118 
The United States unveiled the proposal it would take to 
Kyoto on October 22, 1997, in a speech President Clinton gave 
to the National Geographic Society. First, the United States 
110 See Wirth COP-2 Statement, supra note 68. 
116 And, in another irony, with the exception of the U.S. Agency for International 
Development, agency funding for climate change projects in developing countries was 
scarce. Pomerance Interview, supra note 51. If the U.S. thought developing countries 
should work to reduce their emissions, presumably it would direct its funding to assist 
these efforts. Of course, one must keep in mind that funding for overseas activities is 
usually not a priority of the Executive Branch or Congress, and the Clinton admini-
stration had to pick its funding battles with Congress. Thus, it is not clear that the 
administration would have had any success if it had pushed for this type of funding. 
117 Under Secretary Wirth succinctly described this difference in perspectives be-
tween the U.S. and the developing countries in Congressional testimony: 
"We look at them and point to the cause of the problem in the future; they look at 
us and point to the cause of the problem now. We look at them and worry about 
competitiveness; they look at us, and point to our overwhelmingly better lifestyle 
and standard of living - which most of them are desperate to duplicate, but are 
being told is beyond their reach because of the environmental consequences. As 
President Clinton remarked ... our problem with China li! one of national secu-
rity - it is that China might follow our emissions path, and in so doing would cre-
ate a world unlivable for us all. We look to Kyoto and demand that all countries 
participate; developing countries look to Kyoto and agree to take actions - but 
only after the industrialized world has moved first." 
Wirth Testimony, supra note 100. 
118 Kimble Interview, supra note 38. 
22
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 4 [2002], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol32/iss4/3
2002] CLINTON'S CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY 437 
would propose that industrialized countries "commit to the 
binding and realistic target of returning to emissions of 1990 
levels between 2008 and 2012."119 Second, the United States 
would "embrace flexible mechanisms for meeting these limits," 
including emissions trading and joint implementation.120 Fi-
nally, President Clinton said that the United States would "not 
assume binding obligations unless key developing nations 
meaningfully participate in this effort."121 
Of course, while its proposal was less stringent than the 
one set forth by the EU,122 the administration knew the U.S. 
stabilizing emissions at 1990 levels by the 2008-2012 time pe-
riod would still require substantial effort. U.S. emissions of 
carbon dioxide, the main greenhouse gas, in 1996 were ap-
proximately 9.9 percent greater than in 1990.123 Thus, Clinton 
also announced various efforts the administration was and 
would be taking at home to move the U.S. to a path of reduced 
emissions. These efforts included tax cuts and research and 
development spending worth up to $5 billion over the next 5 
years to encourage energy efficiency and the use of cleaner en-
ergy sources,124 urging "companies to take early actions to re-
119 Clinton's National Geographic Speech, supra note 1, at para. 16. According to 
Pomerance, Clinton's speech originally had called for a 5 percent reduction in emis-
sions, but a member of Clinton's economic team changed 5 to 0 (i.e., stabilization). 
Pomerance Interview, supra note 51. Because an administration group chaired by the 
National Economic Council and Council on Environmental Quality had failed to agree 
upon a target, agreement on a target "number" was left to an internal White House 
process for clearing Presidential speeches. [d. 
120 Clinton's National Geographic Speech, supra note 1, at para. 18. 
1J!' [d. at para. 19. Stuart Eizenstat, who led the negotiations for the U.S. at Kyoto, 
later elaborated on what the administration meant by "meaningful participation": 
[it) means for us the wealthiest countries on a per capita income basis, and the 
biggest emitters assume, over a reasonable period of time, binding commitments. 
They do not necessarily have to be the same commitments as the developed 
world is taking. 
Interview with Stuart Eizenstat, Under Secretary of State for Economic, Business, and 
Agricultural Affairs (Nov. 26, 1997), available at http://www.state.gov Iwww/globall 
oesl971126_eizenstat.html. 
122 In October, Japan and a group of 77 developing countries also announced what 
emissions reductions targets they would be seeking at Kyoto. Japan sought a 5 percent 
reduction in emissions by 2012; the developing countries offered an aggressive proposal 
to limit emissions at thirty-five percent below 1990 levels by 2020. 
123 Author's calculation based on data compiled by the Energy Information Admini-
stration (EIA). Energy Information Administration, Summary of Estimated U.S. Emis-
sions of Greenhouse Gases, 1990-1999, available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf 
/1605/ggrpUtblesl.html (last modified Oct. 31, 2000). 
124 [d. at para. 22. This package of domestic actions became known as the Climate 
Change Technology Initiative (CCTI), a package of spending and tax incentives de-
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duce emissions by ensuring that they receive appropriate credit 
for showing the way,"125 increasing the role of the federal gov-
ernment - one specific goal he set was to install 20,000 solar 
roofs on federal buildings by 2010,126 and bringing competition 
to the electricity industry. 127 
Documents released by the White House Climate Change 
Task Force provided additional context and background to the 
U.S. Kyoto strategy. President Clinton's plan was based on 
five key principles: (1) the policies should be guided by science, 
(2) the policies should rely on market-based common sense 
tools (such as international emissions trading), (3) the U.S. 
should seek "win-win solutions" such as technologies that re-
duce inefficiencies, thus saving money, and reduce emissions, 
(4) global participation is essential to addressing a global prob-
lem (in other words, developing countries must participate), 
and (5) the U.S. government must have "regular common-sense 
reviews" of the economics and science of climate change.128 
Guided by these principles, the administration's plan would 
proceed in three stages,129 First, the administration would 
pursue the efforts described above and conduct an economic 
signed to stimulate the use of energy efficient technologies in buildings, industrial 
processes, vehicles, and power generation. The administration would request $6.3 
billion (not $5 billion) for these activities. THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE CLINTON 
ADMINISTRATION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 3, at 7-8 
128 EIA Summary, supra note 123, at para. 23. Various legislative proposals have 
been introduced to provide credit for entities that take action to reduce emissions prior 
to the enactment of any mandatory emissions reduction scheme. 
126 Id. at para. 25. 
127 Id. at para. 26. Whether deregulating the electricity industry will reduce green-
house gas emissions is a matter of debate - renewable energy is generally more expen-
sive than coal or natural gas, so the ability to sell power openly on the market could 
lead to companies running old polluting inexpensive coal plants at the highest levels 
possible and selling the cheap energy where it couldn't be sold before, because of mar-
ket restrictions. Clinton's speech noted that deregulation must occur "in a way that 
leads to even greater progress in cleaning our air and delivers a significant down pay-
ment in reducing greenhouse gas emissions." Id. The administration's deregulation 
proposal called for a requirement that at 5.5 percent of electricity sales be generated 
from non-hydroelectric renewable sources, subject to a cost cap and included include a 
$3 billion Public Benefits Fund, to support conservation and energy efficiency meas-
ures, research and development into clean and efficient technology, and deployment of 
renewable energy technologies. White House Office of the Press Secretary, The Clinton 
Administration's Comprehensive Electricity Competition Plan, (Mar. 25, 1998), avail-
able at http://clinton6.nara.gov/1998/03/1998-03-25-electricity-plan-paper.html. 
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review near the end of this first stage.130 The second stage, 
which would begin around 2004, would include a review of pro-
gress and next steps as the U.S. moved "toward a market-based 
permit trading system for carbon emissions." A second eco-
nomic review would occur near the end of this stage.131 The 
third stage would be a reduction of emissions to 1990 levels in 
the 2008-2012 period, and below 1990 levels in the 5-year pe-
riod after that. However, prior to beginning the third stage, 
"the second economic update and review would allow Congress 
and the President to evaluate how the economy had responded 
to a decade's worth of experience in the fIrst two stages of the 
President's plan."132 
Clinton's speech at the National Geographic Society and 
the White House's follow up documents accomplished the fol-
lowing crucial objectives. Clinton's speech informed the Ameri-
can public about the seriousness of global warming and the 
strong science behind the conclusion that human activity was 
affecting the climate. 133 The administration told the public 
what it was going to do to stave off global warming, domesti-
cally and internationally. The administration also let the in-
ternational community know what it would put on the table in 
Kyoto. Industry was given notice that the administration 
planned to move to a permit-based trading system, and what 
target the administration would seek. The administration also 
told Congress it would seek the participation of developing 
countries and conduct economic analyses, as called for in the 
Byrd-Hagel Resolution. And, finally, all of these proposals 
were designed to "create an incentive, a market incentive, for 
people to adopt behaviors that will reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions." 134 Now, all the U.S. needed to do was get the rest 




133 Clinton's National Geographic Speech, supra note 1, at para. 12 -130 
... White House Kyoto Press Conference, supra note 200 Fuerth mentioned the fol-
lowing elements: a "positive price incentive" through research and development spend-
ing and tax relief, a greater consciousness to use energy efficient technologies through 
public awareness campaigns and labeling, increasing demand for American energy 
efficient technology abroad by involving developing countries in reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions, and the certainty of a target and timetable allowing businesses to plano 
[do 
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Immediately prior to the Kyoto negotiations, U.S. negotia-
tors went to Oslo, Norway, for discussions on a proposed land 
mine treaty that the U.S. opposed. Negotiators were greeted 
with signs saying "U.S. Go Home."135 In the end, the U.S. did 
not sign on to the treaty and was left isolated. Following this 
failure, according to Kimble, the Kyoto delegation was told, 
"Please don't let this be another OSlO."136 In addition, because 
of deep reservations about the economic impact of binding limi-
tations, negotiators were told to "keep as many options on the 
table to keep costs 10W."137 
1. The Kyoto Negotiations: The U. S. Achieves Most of Its Objec-
tives 
On December 11, 1997, following almost two weeks of ne-
gotiations, with the official last day of negotiations stretching 
out to the following morning,138 parties reached a landmark 
agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the Kyoto Pro-
tocol.139 While the U.S. did not achieve all its negotiating ob-
jectives,140 the emissions targets and timetables and menu of 
market-based options to achieve them all reflect U.S. propos-
als. 141 
" .. , Kimble Interview, supra note 38. 
'36 Id. Pomerance also noted that the experience at the Oslo land mines conference 
affected the U.S. position at the Kyoto negotiations. See also Pomerance Interview, 
supra note 51. 
137 Kimble Interview, supra note 38. 
'08 And with the much publicized intervention of the Vice President of the United 
States, Albert Gore, Jr., who flew to Japan to instruct the U.S. negotiations to show 
flexibility. Kevin Sullivan and Jo Warrick, Gore Speech On Climate Is Criticized; Visit 
to Kyoto Talks Leaves Many Confused About U.S. Message, WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 1997, 
at A1 (Gore instructs U.S. negotiators to show more flexibility but offered no specifics). 
According to the lead U.S. negotiator, the Vice President's trip "energized delegations." 
Press Conference by Under Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs Stu-
art Eizenstat, Kyoto, Japan, as released by the U.S. Delegation at the Climate Change 
Conference (Dec. 11, 1997), available at http://www.state.gov Iwww/globaVoesl971211 
_eizen30p.html [hereinafter Eizenstat Kyoto Press Conference). 
139 For a description of what the round the clock negotiations were like for the U.S., 
see Sperling's remarks, White House Kyoto Press Conference, supra note 20. 
1<" According to Pomerance, the U.S. might have had more success at Kyoto had it 
negotiated with the EU and the developing countries at one table, rather than meeting 
with these groups separately. Pomerance Interview, supra note 51. Presumably, then, 
the U.S. could have tied concessions made to one negotiating group to concessions made 
by the other. 
,<1 The following discussion relies mostly on a fact sheet prepared by the State De-
partment on the Kyoto Protocol. Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental 
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a. A Five-Percent Reduction in Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Industrialized countries agreed to reduce on average 
greenhouse gas emissions by five percent below 1990 emis-
sions, with the U.S. agreeing to a seven percent reduction. 142 
As discussed above, in October President Clinton said the U.S. 
would agree to stabilize emissions at 1990 levels, not reduce 
emissions by seven percent. However, given the structure of 
the deal reached in Kyoto, U.S. negotiators believed that in 
essence the U.S. would have to make the same emissions re-
ductions effort as announced by the President, or "at most a 
three percent real reduction below the President's initial pro-
posal."143 The issue of sinks and synthetic gases is discussed in 
greater detail below. 
b. Reductions over Five-Year Period Beginning in 2008 
Emissions targets are to be reached over a five-year budget 
period and the first period does not begin until 2008.144 This 
was exactly as the U.S. had proposed. By allowing emissions to 
be averaged over a period of years, short-term fluctuations in 
economic performance or weather can be smoothed out. 145 The 
U.S. also pushed for at least a decade before the target period 
began to give time to U.S. businesses to "make the transition to 
greater energy efficiency and/or lower carbon technologies."146 
and Scientific Affairs, Department of State, Fact Sheet on the Kyoto Protocol on Cli-
mate Change, (Jan. 15, 1998), available at http://www.state.gov/www/globalloeslfs_ 
kyoto_ climate_980115.html [hereinafter Kyoto Fact Sheet]. Two transcripts of press 
conferences held immediately following the negotiations also provide the Administra-
tion's point of view, in a more colorful fashion, on what the U.S. achieved in Kyoto. 
See, Eizenstat Kyoto Press Conference, supra note 137. 
142 The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, 3d Sess., [1997] U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/19971L.7/Add.1I1997, art. 3.1 (overall goal 
of 5 percent) and art. 3.7 (describing assigned amounts for Parties in Annex I) re-
printed in 37 I.L.M. 32 (1998) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. Each country's "quantified 
emissions limitation or reduction commitment" is contained in Annex B to the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
.43 Kyoto Fact Sheet, supra note 141. Pomerance notes that because the U.S. had 
failed to agree on a target below stabilization prior to Kyoto, the U.S. was "boxed in" at 
the negotiations. Pomerance Interview, supra note 51. It was not clear what the U.S. 
wanted, whereas the EU had earlier and emphatically agreed to a 15 percent reduc-
tion . 
• 44 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 142, at art. 3.1. 
.46 Kyoto Fact Sheet, supra note 141. 
146 [d. 
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c. Targets Include all Six Greenhouse Gases 
All six major greenhouse gases - carbon dioxide, methane, 
nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons and sulfur 
hexafluoride - are covered by the targets. 147 The latter three 
are substitutes for chlorofluorocarbons and are highly potent 
and long-lived. Because of the lack of data for emissions of 
these gases in 1990, a 1995 baseline for these gases will be 
used. 148 This shift to a higher baseline for the U.S. "accounts 
for about one percent of the seven percent reduction."149 
d. Sinks Activities 
Certain activities that absorb carbon - sinks - may be 
counted against emissions reductions targets. 150 The U.S. 
wanted to encourage the planting of trees and other agricul-
tural and forestry activities that would sequester carbon.151 
The accounting method adopted in Kyoto differs from the one 
the U.S. originally used. The U.S. assumed that the 1990 base-
line would be lowered by carbon-absorbing activities, but it is 
not. 152 This accounts for another three percent of the seven 
percent reduction. 153 
147 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 142, at art. 3.1 and Annex A, which lists the green-
house gases to be included. 
148 ld. at art. 3.8. 
1.. Kyoto Fact Sheet, supra note 141. 
1150 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 142, at art. 3.3 and 3.4. Article 3.3 provides in part 
that the "net changes in greenhouse gas emissions by ... sinks ... limited to afforesta-
tion, reforestation and deforestation since 1990 . . shall be used to meet the commit-
ments under this Article of each Party included in Annex I." Article 3.4 is more com-
plicated. It provides in part that the Conference of the Parties "shall ... decide upon 
modalities, rules and guidelines as to how, and which, additional human-induced ac-
tivities related to ... sinks in the agricultural soils and the land-use change and for-
estry categories shall be added to, or subtracted from, the assigned amounts for Parties 
included in Annex I .. . "ld. 
161 Kyoto Fact Sheet, supra note 141. 
102 ld. As senior official Leon Fuerth put it succinctly, the Kyoto formulation is "a 
more generous scoring of forests than we had in our [proposal)." White House Kyoto 
Press Conference, supra note 20. 
103 Kyoto Fact Sheet, supra note 141. 
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e. Emissions Trading 
Parties may use emissions trading to achieve targets.154 
The agreement to permit emissions trading was another U.S. 
success. Emission trading allows countries that are able to re-
duce emissions cheaply to sell such emissions credits to coun-
tries that otherwise might have to undertake expensive emis-
sions reduction efforts. 155 This preserved flexibility and made 
the agreement cost-effective, in the view of the U.S.156 In addi-
tion, if the European Union could, in effect, trade emissions 
amongst its members by virtue of applying one target to all EU 
members (the EU ''bubble''),157 then other countries should be 
able to trade as well. 
f. Joint Implementation 
The Protocol permits developed countries to acquire and 
trade "emissions reductions units" from projects in developed 
countries. 158 In other words, developed country A may sell 
'04 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 142, at art. 17 (which provides in part that "[t]he 
Parties included in Annex B may participate in emissions trading for the purpose of 
fulfilling their commitments under Article 3. Any such trading shall be supplemental 
to domestic actions for the purpose of meeting [these commitments]"). How "supple-
mental" trading had to be would be a matter of great debate between the European 
Union and the U.S. and its supporters. See also Articles 3.10 (additions to the acquir-
ing Party's assigned amount) and 3.11 (subtractions from the transferring Party's 
assigned amount). 
'60 Interestingly, several key developing countries (India, China and Indonesia) 
strongly opposed emissions trading during the Kyoto Conference, almost leading to a 
breakdown in negotiations. See White House Kyoto Press Conference, supra note 20. 
Why would developing countries care if developed countries use emissions trading? 
Developed countries might use emissions trading instead of undertaking emissions 
reductions at home -- especially Russia, which, due to the collapse of its economy, 
would have many excess credits to sell. See J.W. ANDERSON, THE KyOTO PROTOCOL ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE: BACKGROUND, UNRESOLVED IsSUES, AND NEXT STEPS, 16 (Jan. 
1998). 
1118 See Kyoto Fact Sheet, supra note 141 ("Structured effectively, emissions trading 
can provide a powerful economic incentive to cut emissions while also allowing impor-
tant flexibility for taking cost-effective actions."). 
'67 In fact, at the U.S. press conference on the last day of the negotiations, Under 
Secretary Eizenstat announced the formation of an "umbrella" group composed for 
trading of the new emissions rights, which would consist of the U.S., Canada, Japan, 
New Zealand, Australia and Russia. Other countries were welcome to join. See Eizen-
stat Kyoto Press Conference, supra note 137. 
'OIl Kyoto Protocol, supra note 142, at art. 6. See also art. 3.10 (addition of project-
based emissions reductions units to the acquiring Party's assigned amount) and 3.11 
(subtraction of project-based emissions reductions units from the transferring Party's 
29
Royden: Clinton's Climate Change Policy
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2002
444 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:4 
emissions reductions units generated from a project in its coun-
try to developed country B. Participation by the private sector 
(companies) is allowed. 159 
g. Clean Development Mechanism 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) allows for devel-
oped country parties to use certified emissions reductions gen-
erated by projects in developing countries,160 One of the most 
innovative features of the Kyoto Protocol is the CDM. It will 
allow developed country parties to use certified emissions re-
ductions generated by projects in developing countries towards 
their targets. 161 The U.S. saw this as part of the "down pay-
ment" in the Kyoto Protocol on developing country participa-
tion,162 Participation by private sector entities is permitted,163 
and projects can begin to generate credits as early as the year 
2000.164 Thus, Annex I parties can look all over the world to 
find the cheapest emissions reductions, and incentives are cre-
ated to transfer technology to the developing world. 165 In addi-
tion, a small portion of the proceeds of the CDM is directed to 
"assist developing country Parties that are particularly vulner-
assigned amount) . 
• 69 [d. at art. 6.3 . 
• 60 [d. at art. 12. See also art. 3.12 (certified emissions reductions acquired under 
Article 12 shall be added to the assigned amount of the acquiring Party). 
161 Though the COM evolved from a proposal by Brazil, some developing countries 
opposed the COM on the grounds that it constituted "environmental colonialism," pre-
sumably because they feared developed countries would use COM investments to dic-
tate how Third World countries would develop. Anderson, supra note 155. While the 
COM would promote investment, developing countries were more interested in devel-
oped countries meeting their commitments for "new and additional financial re-
sources." Kyoto Protocol, supra note 142, at art. 1l.2(a); UNFCCC, supra note 43, at 
art. 4.3 (to meet developing countries' full costs in compiling an inventory of green-
house gases emissions sources and sinks); Anderson, supra note 155, at 16-17 . 
• 62 Kyoto Fact Sheet, supra note 141. 
'63 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 142, at art. 12.9 . 
• 64 [d. at Article 12.10 . 
• 60 Or, as Gene Sperling put it: 
[The COM] also creates market incentives in which, through partnerships with 
other countries, there's opportunities to have, you know, win-win situations 
where you would be helping retool aspects of another country's economy, but in 
ways that would profit to American companies and make it easier for us to hit 
our targets. 
White House Kyoto Press Conference, supra note 20. 
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able to the adverse effects of climate change to meet the costs of 
ada pta tion."166 
h. Developing Countries 
Despite achieving most of its negotiating objectives, the 
U.S. did not secure meaningful participation by developing 
countries. Parties failed to agree to include a proposed Article 
10, which would have allowed developing countries to volunteer 
to take on a binding emissions target. 167 Argentina and a 
number of other developing countries tried to reopen discus-
sions on this article, but other developing countries evidently 
blocked this discussion. 168 While the CDM would provide an 
incentive for emissions reductions projects in developing coun-
tries, Under Secretary Eizenstat admitted that this was not 
sufficient developing country involvement. 169 
1. Issues and Details Remaining after Kyoto. 
While the Kyoto Protocol set the stage for a binding regime 
with emissions targets, many details remained to be spelled out 
in order to make the agreement workable. Some important 
issues were left unaddressed: 
• Compliance: Article 18 directed the Conference of the Par-
ties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Protocol (af-
fectionately known as the "COPIMOP") to take up the issue 
of compliance. What would be the consequences of not meet-
ing a target? Who decides who is in compliance with a tar-
get? Should only developed country parties judge compli-
ance with targets since they are the parties with that obliga-
tion? How do you assess compliance with provisions such as 
Article 3.14, which states that Annex I parties "shall strive 
to implement the [emissions reduction] commitment ... in 
such a way as to minimize adverse social, environmental 
and economic impacts on developing country Parties? 
166 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 142, at art 12.8. 
167 Eizenstat Kyoto Press Conference, supra note 137. 
168 [d. 
169 [d. ("Clearly, despite the very important step taken through the Brazilian process 
of creating a Clean Development Mechanism for Credit, that meaningful participation 
has not yet been taken as a result of the steps that were done here. "). [d. 
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• Sinks: What activities could be credited under Article 
3.4? Are sinks counted 100 percent or are they discounted? 
• Emissions trading: Who will be allowed to trade emissions 
rights - just government or also private fIrms? What rules 
will apply? Who will monitor and broker emissions trades? 
• Supplementarity: If emissions trading is to be "supple-
mental" to domestic action, what does "supplemental" mean, 
if anything? Does it mean that over half of a country's ef-
forts to reduce emissions must come from domestic action, or 
is supplemental non-quantifIable? 
• Making the CDM operational: Emissions reductions are 
supposed to be certifIed by "operational entities"17o - what 
would these entities be and how would they make their de-
cisions? What would be the certifIcation criteria and how 
open would the decision-making process be? How would 
these projects be audited and verifIed?l71 What criteria if 
any would be used to determine if a project helped a devel-
oping country Party "in achieving sustainable develop-
ment"?172 For example, are nuclear power plants permissi-
ble projects? Sinks projects?173 
• Fungibility (transferability). The Kyoto Protocol mentions 
certifIed emissions reductions (under the CDM), emissions 
reduction units (from joint implementation) and transfer of 
assigned amounts (under emissions trading). A key ques-
tion for the private sector question is whether these "units" 
are all interchangeable. If they are not, then it would effect 
170 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 142, at art. 12.5. 
171 Id. at art. 12.7. 
m Article 12.2 provides that part of the purpose of the CDM "shall be to assist Par-
ties not included in Annex I in achieving sustainable development ... " [d. at art. 12.2. 
173 Environmental groups expressed concern about including sinks, clean coal or 
nuclear projects in the CDM. See, e.g. Nuclear Power Not Part of Global Warming 
Solution, World Wildlife Fund Press Release (Apr. 6, 2000); Renewable Energy, Energy 
Efficiency & the CDM, Greenpeace (Nov. 2000), available at http://www.greenpeace.org 
/-climate/climatecountdownlrenewsinks.pdf (stating that CDM should only include 
state-of-the-art renewable energy or high-value demand side efficiency technologies, 
not coal or sinks). With regard to sinks, some environmental groups were concerned 
that including sinks in the CDM would provide an incentive to log existing trees and 
replace them with fast-growing trees (like eucalyptus), in order to gain sequestration 
credits. See, e.g. The Clearcut Case: How the Kyoto Protocol Could Become a Driver for 
Deforestation, World Wildlife Fund, available at http://www.panda.org 
/resources/publications/climatelcarbonsinks/carbonsinks.html. 
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the liquidity of any market that developed for trading these 
units. 
447 
Thus, despite addressing and resolving a number of diffi-
cult issues, including binding targets and timetables, negotia-
tors still had a full plate to tackle before they could bring back 
a ratifiable agreement to their respective governments. In par-
ticular, the U.S. needed to educate many countries about the 
value of market mechanisms such as emissions trading and 
how these mechanisms would work,114 in order to make pro-
gress in future negotiations so that these provisions would be 
operationaJ.175 Furthermore, developing countries had their 
own, strikingly different agenda: to compel developed countries 
to provide the new and additional financial resources and tech-
nology transfer called for in both the UNFCCC and the Proto-
col. 176 
The U.S. also faced a number of challenges at home. To 
satisfy Congress, the U.S. still needed to obtain meaningful 
participation by developing countries and to show that the 
Kyoto approach would not hurt the U.S. economy. Key indus-
try groups, such as coal, oil, electric utility, and car companies, 
opposed the agreement.177 And while news reports suggest 
that President Clinton and Vice President Gore felt that failure 
to reach agreement would have "enraged environmentalists," 178 
"4 As stated by Under Secretary Eizenstat, "When we first proposed these type [sic] 
of market-based mechanisms in Kyoto, it was almost a foreign concept to other gov-
ernment. They had no experience .... So our leadership there [at Kyoto] and our ex-
perience in this area are really critical." Mason, supra note 97, at 433. 
"6 The importance to the U.S. of this effort on market mechanisms cannot be under-
stated. The agreement would not be cost-effective for the U.S. if these mechanisms 
were not available. Under Secretary Eizenstat made this clear in testimony before the 
Senate soon after Kyoto, "Ensuring that we can meet our target reductions cost-
effectively will depend significantly on access to the flexibility mechanisms we fought 
hard to include in the Kyoto Protocol. Let me be very clear: The commitment we made 
in Kyoto would not have been made - could not have been made - were it not for the 
flexibility mechanisms that were also agreed there. Until we are satisfied with the 
rules and procedures yet to be established, the promise of Kyoto will never be realized." 
Statement of Stuart E. Eizenstat, Under Secretary of State for Economic, Business and 
Agricultural Affairs before the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and For-
estry (Mar. 5, 1998) [hereinafter Eizenstat Senate Committee Statement). 
"6 See, e.g., Kyoto Protocol, supra note 142, at art. 10(c) (technology transfer) and 
art. 11 (fmancial mechanism). 
177 See, e.g., Kevin Sullivan, Lobbyists Turn Up the Heat at Global Warming Forum; 
Industry Makes Its Case Against Proposed Treaty, WASH. POST, Dec. 4,1997, at Al. 
178 James Bennet, Warm Globe, Hot Politics: For Clinton and Gore, Fight Looms in 
the Senate, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 11,1997. 
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some environmental groups may have preferred such failure 
because they believed that the agreement amounted to legiti-
mizing a betrayal and compromise of the UNFCCC's core objec-
tives. The World Wildlife Fund called Kyoto "a flawed agree-
ment that will allow major polluters to continue emitting 
greenhouse gasses through loopholes."179 
F. 1998: INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC RESISTANCE TO U.S. 
CLIMATE STRATEGY 
In testimony before the Senate in March 1998, Under Sec-
retary of State Eizenstat laid out the administration's agenda 
following the Kyoto Protocol. First, the U.S. would work hard 
to "ensure that the rules and procedures adopted enable emis-
sions trading, joint implementation and the Clean Develop-
ment Mechanism to work smoothly and efficiently ... [and to] 
work closely with our industries to be sure they are satisfied 
that the emissions trading system which is developed is as effi-
cient and effective as possible to meet their needs."180 The in-
ternational effort would include workshops in trading held by 
the U.S. and the EU and work by the U.N. Commission on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) with developing coun-
tries. 181 Second, the U.S. would "put on a full court diplomatic 
press to bring developing nations into a meaningful role in 
helping solve the global climate challenge."182 This effort would 
include bilateral agreements and using regional and multilat-
eral fora such as the Summit of the Americas process. 183 It 
would also include working with international financing insti-
tutions such as the World Bank to promote in developing coun-
tries investments in clean energy and energy efficient technol-
ogy and market-based energy sector policies that will help re-
duce greenhouse gas emissions. 184 Eizenstat also called on 
Congress to fully fund the Administration's request for contri-
179 [d. However, Fred Krupp, executive director of the Environmental Defense Fund 
(now called Environmental Defense), said that while much work remained to be done 
on the agreement, "Vice President Gore should be commended for coming to Japan and 
opening the doors to an agreement." [d. 
180 Eizenstat Senate Committee Statement, supra note 175. 
181 Mason, supra note 97, at 433. 
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butions for UNFCCC work - in particular the U.S.'s pledge to 
the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), to which the U.S. 
owed $300 million. 185 
The Administration announced a $6.3 billion Climate 
Change Technology Initiative to cut U.S. greenhouse gas emis-
sions over the next 5 years.186 The initiative consisted of $3.6 
billion in tax credits for energy-efficient purchases and renew-
able energy and $2.7 billion for new research and development 
(R&D) spending over 5 years,187 The proposal covered tax cred-
its for consumers who purchased advanced technology, highly 
efficient vehicles, extensions of wind and biomass power tax 
credits, research and development spending for highly efficient 
cars, and a $100 million increase in appropriations for solar 
and renewable energy research and development.188 
Why didn't the administration submit a legislative package 
on emissions reductions in order to put the U.S. on track to 
meet its Kyoto targets? The Kyoto decision had gotten consid-
erable, mostly favorable press coverage in the United States,189 
However, in January of 1998 news broke that the President 
had had an affair with White. House intern Monica Lewin-
185 Id. 
186 Id. As noted previously, this proposal evolved from the President's announce-
ment in October 1997. The $6 billion proposal was first outlined in the President's 
State of the Union address in January. The White House Office ofthe Press Secretary, 
State of the Union Address by the President, (Jan. 27, 1998) available at 
http://clinton6.nara.gov/1998/01l1998-01-27-state-of-the-union-address-by-the-
president.html. 
'.7 Eizenstat Senate Committee Statement, supra note 175. 
188 Id. 
189 See, e:g., Kyoto Accord Is a Start Along the Right Track, L. A. TIMES, Dec. 11, 
1997, at 8; One Step Forward at Kyoto Global Warming, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, 
Dec. 12, 1997, at D22 (editorial praising agreement); Joby Warrick, Climate Pact Res-
cued in Final Hours; Turbulence Pervaded First Round of Greenhouse Gas Talks, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 1997, at AI; Up to Speed; The Week's Top Stories; Global Warm-
ing Pact OK'd, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Dec. 14, 1997), at D2; Indira A.R. Lakshmanan, 
Accord Set on Cutting Emissions; 160 Nations in Agreement; US Hails 'Historic First 
Step', BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 11, 1997, at AI; Maggie Farley, Summit Decrees 6% Reduc-
tion in Main Global Warming, L. A. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1997, at 1. Commentators recog-
nized Kyoto's uphill battle in the Senate and that implementation would require sub-
stantial work by the Administration. See, e.g., James Gerstenzang, Global Warming 
Accord Faces Tough Fight in Senate, L. A. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1997, at 12; Tom Teepen, 
Sensible Public Can Save Global Warming Treaty, ATLANTA CONST., Dec. 16, 1997, at 
A27 (editorial saying that public can be administration's biggest ally in getting Kyoto 
Protocol through the Senate); Fred Hiatt, Lukewarm Results on Climate Control, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 1997, at A27 (editorial saying that to make treaty evolve into 
something meaningful "will take a sustained and committed administration campaign 
at home and overseas"). 
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sky,190 Once that happened, "the administration could do noth-
ing," said former Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans 
and International Environmental and Scientific Mfairs 
Melinda Kimble,191 More specifically, once the Lewinsky affair 
took political center stage, it became difficult for Clinton to 
move forward with any policies, domestic or international. In 
addition, more importantly, the administration also lacked a 
domestic consensus to take action, as there were serious con-
cerns about the costs of undertaking domestic emissions reduc-
tions. 192 
The administration faced "real hostility" from several 
members of Congress upset about the Kyoto Protocol. 193 The 
U.S. delegation members were caught up in Congressional 
subpoenas and hearings and agencies were inundated with let-
ters from Congress submitting questions on climate. 194 Ad-
ministration officials that needed confirmation from the Senate 
were held Up.195 Fueling the fire was an EPA document assert-
ing that the EPA had the authority to regulate carbon dioxide 
under the Clean Air Act, which caused some to worry that the 
administration might try to establish a domestic regulatory 
scheme for carbon dioxide prior to ratification of the Kyoto Pro-
tocol. 196 To address some Congress members' concern that the 
100 See, e.g., Susan Schmidt et aI., Clinton Accused of Urging Aide to Lie; Starr 
Probes Whether President Told Woman to Deny Alleged Affair to Jones's Lawyers, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 1998, at Al (reporting that Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr 
was expanding his investigation of Clinton to see whether Clinton encouraged Monica 
Lewinsky to lie to lawyers for Paula Jones about her affair with the President); Peter 
Baker and Susan Schmidt, FBI Taped Aide's Allegations; Seeking Cooperation, Bureau 
Confronted Ex-White House Intern, WASIL POST, Jan. 22, 1998, at Al (FBI tapes 
Lewinksy saying that Clinton urged her to lie about their sexual relationship). 
191 Kimble Interview, supra note 38. Pomerance agrees that after the scandal hit, 
the administration "had no traction." Pomerance Interview, supra note 5l. 
192 Kimble Interview, supra note 38. 
193 ld. 
'94 Id. 
,.. See, e.g., Michael Tebo, Senate Nominees Block Nominee for Top State Depart-
ment Post Until White House Releases Its Climate Costs Analysis, (July 17, 1998), 
available at http://www. weathervane.rff.orglnegtable/nominee_blocked.html). (Senator 
Chuck Hagel says that his panel will not act on the nomination of Frank Loy for Under 
Secretary of State for Global Affairs until the White House releases information de-
manded by Congress). Id. 
'96 An EPA document entitled "Electricity Restructuring and the Environment: 
What Authority Does EPA Have and What Does it Need," stated that EPA could regu-
late carbon dioxide. See Theresa Sotto, House Members Assert EPA Cannot Regulate 
C02 under the Clean Air Act, (Mar. 20, 2000), available at 
http://www.weathervane.rff.orglfeatures/feature090.html. Congressman Tom DeLay 
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Clinton administration was moving too fast on climate change, 
Representative Knollenberg attached an amendment to a Fis-
cal Year 1999 appropriations bill stipulating that no funds 
could be used "for the purpose of implementation, or in prepa-
ration for implementation, of the Kyoto Protocol."197 These bat-
tles with Congress over the administration's strategy and ap-
proach for addressing climate change would continue until the 
end of the Administration. 
Congressional concerns about the costs to the U.S. of com-
pliance with Kyoto prompted the administration to prepare an 
economic analysis of Kyoto. In March, Council of Economic 
Advisers (CEA) Chair Dr. Janet Yellen testified before the 
House Commerce Committee that compliance with Kyoto 
would mean for household consumers an increase of three to 
five percent in energy costs in the years 2008-2012, or in other 
words, it would raise the average household's energy bill in ten 
years by between $70 and $110 per year.198 While Yellen did 
questioned this interpretation, prompting EPA Administrator Carol Browner to ask for 
a legal opinion from her General C01IDsel. [d. One month later the then General 
Counsel Jonathan Z. Cannon submitted a memo to Browner stating that EPA did have 
authority under the Clean Air Act to regulate carbon dioxide since it met the defmition 
of "pollutant" in the Act. Id. Several members of Congress disagreed, prompting a 
series of correspondence between the Hill and EPA on the matter. Browner eventually 
stated at a hearing in February 2000 that regulating carbon dioxide was not within 
EPA's authority, though EPA's general counsel contended that while the Administra-
tion currently did not have any intention of enacting such a program, if it wanted to, it 
could. [d. (citing EPA General Counsel Gary Guzy affirming the opinion of his prede-
cessor); Jennifer B. Thatcher, EPA Administrator Browner Cites Global Warming as 
One of Top Environmental Problems," (Feb. 24, 2000), available at 
http://www.weathervane.rff.org/features/feature088.html (describing Browner testi-
mony about lack of EPA authority on carbon dioxide). 
197 Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and 
Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, H.R. 4194 (1999) (under "Environmental 
Programs and Management"). According to Knollenberg, the "main purpose" of his 
amendment was to "ensure that existing regulatory authority is not misused to imple-
ment or to serve as a future basis for the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol in ad-
vance of its consideration and approval by the Senate of the United States." CONGo 
REC. H6565 (daily ed. July 29, 1998). Conceivably any action designed to improve 
energy efficiency or promote renewable energy abroad or domestically, or to discuss 
means of implementing Kyoto (such as the flexibility mechanisms), could arguably be 
deemed "preparation for implementation of the Kyoto Protocol." A shorter version of 
the amendment was attached to Fiscal Year 2000 legislation as well. U.S. Department 
of Agriculture Appropriations Act, H.R. 1906, § 739 ("None of the funds appropriated 
by this Act shall be used to propose or issue rules, regulations, decrees, or orders for 
the purpose of implementation, or in preparation for implementation of the Kyoto Pro-
tocol ."). 
198 Dr. Janet Yellen, Chair, Council of Economic Advisers, Statement before the U.S. 
Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry (Mar. 5, 1998). 
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not provide any detailed economic analysis to support these 
calculations at that time, she did note that this analysis as-
sumed the U.S. would use the flexibility mechanisms in the 
Kyoto Protocol. 199 In fact, Yellen later testified that the ability 
to trade among Annex I countries alone would reduce the U.S.' 
costs of compliance in half: 
Estimates derived from the [Second Generation Model] 
model confirm that emissions trading among Annex I countries 
can reduce the cost to the United States of achieving its targets 
for 2008-2012 emissions by about half relative to a situation in 
which such trading was not available.20o 
Critics were not satisfied with the White House's analysis, 
so the House Science Committee requested the Energy Infor-
mation Administration, an independent entity within the De-
partment of Energy, to conduct its own analysis of the cost of 
greenhouse gas reductions on the U.S. economy.201 EIA's 
analysis, released in October, indicated that energy prices 
could increase significantly - much greater than the Admini-
199 [d. The administration's analysis also assumes that the trading system will work 
with "near-perfect efficiency." Raymond J. Kopp and J.W. Anderson, Estimating the 
Costs of Kyoto: How Plausible are the Clinton Administration's Figures? (Mar. 12, 
1998), available at http://www.weathervane.rif.org/features/feature034.html. In addi-
tion, it also assumes that cheap emissions reductions outside the U.S. will be easily 
attainable and available. [d. On the other hand, the model used (the so-called Second 
Generation Model) did not include the effects of new domestic initiatives such as elec-
tricity restructuring and the Climate Change Technology Initiative, which could de-
crease the costs of compliance. See The White House, Meeting the Challenge of Cli-
mate Change at a Reasonable Cost Fact Sheet, (July 31, 1998), available at 
http://www.state.gov/www/globaUoeslfs3limate30sts_980731.html. Avoided costs of 
environmental and health damage from climate change were also not included. [d. For 
an illuminating discussion of how a model's assumptions can greatly change the esti-
mated costs of a greenhouse gas reduction policy, see Robert Repetto and Duncan Aus-
tin, The Costs of Climate Protection: A Guide for the Perplexed? (World Resources In-
stitute 1997). Repetto and Austin identified several key assumptions that accounted 
for more than 80 percent of the differences in economic predictions across sixteen mod-
els. These key assumptions included whether emissions trading is allowed, whether 
the model assumes that non-fossil energy sources will be available at a competitive 
price, and how quickly technological change is assumed to occur. [d. at 5 and 7. 
200 Dr. Janet Yellen, Chair, Council of Economic Advisers, Statement before the U.S. 
House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Subcom-
mittee on National Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs (May 
19, 1998), available at http://www.state.gov/www/policYJemarks /1998/980519...Yellen 
3limate.html. 
201 Energy Information Administration, What Does the Kyoto Protocol Mean to U.S. 
Energy Markets and the U.S. Economy? A Briefing Paper on the Energy Information 
Administration's Analysis and Report Prepared for the Committee on Science, U.S. 
House of Representatives, 3 (Oct 1998) (Pub. No. SRiOIAF/98-03 (S)). 
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• stration's analysis suggested. For example, in order to meet 
the emissions reductions in its various scenarios, "average de-
livered energy costs ... must be between seventeen and eighty-
three percent higher than projected in 2010."202 However, 
EIA's analysis focused on domestic actions because provisions 
for international trading, sinks, and the CDM had not been 
spelled out and it was unclear to what extent other countries 
would participate in them.203 EIA's analysis, per the House 
Committee's request, also used the same assumptions it used 
in developing its Annual Energy Outlook. Thus, EIA's analysis 
did not consider any proposed changes in federal or state law, 
policy or standards through the year 2020, and thus did not 
consider the administration's Climate Change Technology Ini-
tiative.204 
The EIA analysis also included projected impacts on spe-
cific industries such as electricity, coal and gasoline, predicting 
that these industries faced "major adjustments."205 For exam-
ple, an additional 10,000 to 43,000 coal miners' jobs could be 
lost.206 The average price of gasoline could increase by between 
eleven and fifty-three percent in 2010.207 Of course, these pre-
dictions generated a fire storm of controversy: how could the 
Administration have signed up to such a bad deal for the U.S. 
economy? Critics were quick to point to the EIA analysis as 
proof that a greenhouse gas control regime would harm the 
U.S. economy.208 
2ITl [d. at 2. The analysis also predicted that the price of carbon per metric ton would 
reach between $67 and $348 by 2010. [d. at 4. The administration's analysis pre-
dicted a range of $14 to $23 per ton of carbon equivalent in 2008-2012. Yellen Testi-
mony, supra note 200. 
203 See http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaflkyoto/scope.html. 
204 [d. 
... Energy Information Administration, supra note 201, at 5. 
206 [d. at 7 . 
. 'JJJ7 Id. at 10. 
208 The debate about how much a greenhouse gas control regime will cost, and what 
is the upper limit on acceptable costs, continues. As noted by Resources for the Future 
(RFF), a policy think tank that focuses on providing unbiased policy-relevant analysis, 
estimates range from $25 to $300 per ton of carbon avoided. J. W. Anderson, Richard D. 
Morgenstern, and Michael A. Toman, At Buenos Aires and Beyond, 134 RESOURCES 6-9 
(Winter 1999), at 8. One option that has been discussed is to place a ceiling on the cost 
of compliance. [d. That is, a regime would be structured so that if the price of permits 
reached a certain cost level, the government would step in and sell as many permits as 
needed at that price. [d. This would ensure that the costs of control would not exceed 
a certain level. [d. (This proposal is also known as the "safety valve" proposal.) This 
would trade certainty of emissions reductions for certainty of costs, but if predictions 
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But despite these battles over how much implementation 
of Kyoto would cost, a growing number of U.S. companies 
agreed that global warming warranted action and announced 
actions to reduce, avoid or sequester emissions.209 Earlier in 
1998, the Pew Center on Climate Change210 launched a $5 mil-
lion campaign to build industry support for taking action on 
climate change, with over 20 major corporations on its Busi-
ness Environmental Leadership Council. 211 In fact, numerous 
companies had begun to identify business opportunities that 
would arise from an international carbon control regim~.~12 
Several major industries and the Environmental Defense Fund 
participated in discussions regarding credit for early action by 
businesses. This led to the introduction of a bill by Senator 
John Chafee in October 1998 that would have permitted the 
president to enter into binding agreements with U.S. busi-
nesses that could generate credits usable in any future domes-
tic program that requires mitigation of greenhouse gases before 
2008.213 
In the meantime, the Administration geared up for COP-4, 
to be held in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in November 1998. 
about costs being low are correct, then the trigger level would not be met. This pro-
posal is currently being advanced by Americans for Equitable Climate Solutions, 
headed by former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Environment Rafe Pom-
erance. 
209 Stuart Eizenstat, Head of DelegationlUnder Secretary of State, U.S. Delegation 
to the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties-4 Press Briefing (Nov. 14, 1998), available at 
http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarksl19981981114_eizen_brief.html [hereinafter 
Eizenstat COP-4 Press Conferencel. ("In Kyoto, only a handful of companies would 
even acknowledge that the threat of climate change is real. A year later, a growing 
number are becoming full partners in our efforts and pledging real action to reduce 
emissions."). 
210 The Pew Center on Global Climate Change is a non-profit, non-partisan and 
independent organization working to provide innovative solutions to addressing global 
climate change. Established in 1998 by the Pew Charitable Trusts, the Center is led by 
Eileen Claussen, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International 
Environmental and Scientific Mfairs, available at http://www.pewclimate.org. 
211 Pew Center on Global Climate Change, Major Corporations Join Effort to Solve 
Climate Change Problem, (May 7, 1998), available at http://www.pewclimate.org 
Imedialpr _major .cfm. 
212 Summary of the Fourth Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention 
on Climate Change 2-13 November 1998, EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULLETIN, Vol. 12 No. 
97, Nov. 16, 1998, at 14. 
213 Michael Tebo, New Senate Bill Introduces Early Credits for Emissions Reduc-
tions, (Oct. 14, 1998) (describing S.2617), available at http:// www.weathervane.rff.org 
Inegtable/senate_bill.html. 
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Meetings of the Convention's subsidiary bodies214 in Bonn in 
March indicated that the U.S. would face significant hurdles in 
gaining acceptance for the flexibility mechanisms in the Kyoto 
Protocol. For example, the European Union proposed that a 
cap be placed on a country's ability to use trading to achieve its 
target, and many developing countries ''balked'' at pressure to 
move rapidly on the flexibility mechanisms until they under-
stood them better.215 However, parties did agree to request a 
special report from the IPCC to advise them on the use of 
sinks,216 and the panel was expected to provide a report in 
2000.217 While this meant that rules on sinks could not be set 
at COP-4, it did mean that once the report was issued decisions 
could be made. 
1. COP-4: Buenos Aires Plan of Action 
The U.S. realized that it was unlikely that parties at COP-
4 would make significant progress in making the flexibility 
mechanisms operational, including the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM). (Credits generated in 2000 from CDM pro-
jects may be applied in the first commitment period, so deci-
sions on this mechanism were needed promptly.)218 Its goal, 
then, was to preserve what had been agreed to at Kyoto and 
keep all options on the table.219 But it also hoped that at least 
some developing countries would indicate a willingness to limit 
emissions. 22o The U.S. succeeded at Buenos Aires in achieving 
these goals. 
First, the parties agreed to a two-year plan with deadlines 
for reaching agreement on key issues in order to make the 
214 The two subsidiary bodies are the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) and 
the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA). 
21. Michael Tebo, Bonn Negotiations Wrap Up, (June 16, 1998), available at 
http://www.weathervane.rff.org/negtable/bonn_wrapup.html. For an official description 
of what transpired at the meetings, see Documents FCCC/SBSTNI99816 and 
FCCC/SBIII998/6, available at http://www.unfccc.de (reports of the two subsidiary 
bodies, the SBI and the SBSTA). 
216 REPORT OF THE SUBSIDIARY BODY FOR SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL ADVICE 
ON ITS EIGHTH SESSION, BONN, 2-12 JUNE 1998, Doc. No. FCCC/SBSTNI99816) (Aug. 
20, 19980, at paras. 45(e) and (0, available at http://www.unfccc.de. 
217 Michael Tebo, Bonn Negotiations Wrap Up, (June 16, 1998), available at 
http://www.weathervane.rff.org/negtable/bonn_wrapup.html. 
218 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 142, at art. 12.10. 
219 Kimble Interview, supra note 38. 
220 [d. 
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Kyoto Protocol operational, resulting in the "Buenos Aires Plan 
of Action."221 In particular, negotiators agreed to decide by the 
end of 2000 rules and guidelines for Kyoto's market-based 
mechanisms and laid out a detailed work schedule.222 Also im-
portant to the U.S., a schedule for considering rules and proce-
dures for compliance, including consequences for noncompli-
ance, was also laid out.223 In a success for the U.S., parties 
agreed to continue the pilot phase for "Activities Implemented 
Jointly,"224 which would give developing countries experience in 
emissions reduction and sequestration projects prior to the op-
eration of the CDM.225 The COP "urged" developed country 
parties to "take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and 
finance, as appropriate, the transfer of environmentally sound 
technologies and know-how to developing country Parties and 
their access thereto," and support capacity-building in develop-
ing country parties.226 Parties also established a work plan for 
consideration of adverse impacts of climate change and re-
sponse measures.227 The parties also provided further guidance 
to the Global Environmental Facility228 with regard to provid-
ing funding to developing countries, including calling for it to 
streamline its procedures, key issues for developing coun-
tries.229 In addition, the parties agreed that the special report 
on land use, land use change and forestry being prepared by 
221 REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES ON ITS FOURTH SESSION, HELD AT 
BUENOS AIRES FROM 2 TO 14 NOVEMBER 1998, ADDENDUM: PART TwO: ACTION TAKEN 
BY THE CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES AT ITS FOURTH SESSION, Decision 1tCP.4 (Doc. No. 
FCCCtCPt1998t161Add.1) (Jan. 20, 1999) [hereinafter Buenos Aires Plan of Action 
(COP-4)]. 
222 [d. at 22-31 (Decision 7tCP.4). 
223 [d. at 37 (Decision 8ICP.4). See also Bureau of Oceans and International Envi-
ronmental and Scientific Affairs, U.S. Department of State, The Buenos Aires Climate 
Change Conference, (Dec. 1998), available at http://www.state.gov 
Iwwwtglobal/globaUssuestclimatetfs-cop4_final_981200.html [hereinafter State De-
partment Fact Sheet on COP-4]. 
224 Buenos Aires Plan of Action (COP-4), supra note 221, at 20-21 (Decision 6tCP.4). 
221! See State Department Fact Sheet on COP-4, supra note 223. 
226 Buenos Aires Plan of Action (COP-4), supra note 221, at 12 (Decision 4tCP.4, 
Article 3(a». 
227 [d. at 17-19 (Decision 5tCP.4) 
226 The Global Environment Facility (GEF) serves as the funding mechanism for the 
UNFCCC, as well as other international agreements. The GEF funds projects in four 
focal areas: biodiversity, climate change, international waters, and ozone. Projects to 
address land degradation, as it relates to the four focal areas, are also eligible for fund-
ing. See http://www.gefweb.orglindex.html. 
229 Buenos Aires Plan of Action (COP-4), supra note 221, at 5 (Decision 21CP.4). 
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the IPCC should inform decisions of the subsidiary bodies on 
sinks issues. 23o In recognition of the tremendous workload, the 
U.S. successfully convinced parties to hold an increasing num-
ber of high -level consult a tions. 231 
Most importantly for the U.S. - and what the U.S. hoped 
would be the fIrst of many announcements232 - Argentina, the 
host of COP-4, announced that it would take on a target for 
emissions reductions for the period 2008-2012.233 No target 
was specifIed, but Argentina said it would announce its target 
by the next COP.234 In addition, Kazakhstan announced a 
similar intention to take on a binding target.235 Underscoring 
once again the importance of bringing developing countries on 
board, Vice President Gore issued a statement saying he was 
"particularly pleased by the growing engagement of developing 
countries, marked most notably by Argentina's pledge to take 
on a binding emissions target," and he "commended" Kazakh-
stan for its pledge. 236 The head of the U.S. delegation re-
marked on the "promising new spirit of engagement that is 
helping to bridge the divide between developed and developing 
nations." 237 However, this ''bridge'' was made of tenuous mat-
230 Id. at 40-41 (Decision 9/CPA) 
231 See Eizenstat COP-4 Press Conference, supra note 209. 
232 Id. (predicting that developing country reluctance to take on targets will "dissi-
pate as the model of Argentina spreads"). 
233 Address by the President of the Republic of Argentina, contained in the REPORT 
OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES ON ITS FOURTH SESSION, HEL'o AT BUENOS AIRES 
FROM 12 TO 14 NOVEMBER 1998, PART ONE: PROCEEDINGS, 35 (Jan. 20, 1999). It is 
unclear how a developing country emissions target would be incorporated into the 
Protocol. See State Department Fact Sheet on COP-4, supra note 223 (noting that the 
announcements by Argentina and Kazakhstan "present a new challenge to the parties" 
since the Protocol does not contain provisions for developing countries to voluntarily 
agree to binding emission targets). Observers speculate that Argentina may have 
agreed to take on a target because of its status as the host country for the negotiations, 
its candidacy to join the OECD and the close relationship between Presidents Menem 
and Clinton. Summary ofthe Fourth Conference, supra note 212, at 13. 
234 Address by the President of the Republic of Argentina, supra note 233. Argentina 
never has announced a target and subsequent economic difficulties make it unlikely it 
will. 
230 State Department Fact Sheet on COP-4, supra note 223. See also Michael Tebo, 
COP-4 Concludes with a 'Sea Change in Attitude' and a Special 'Plan of Action', avail-
able at http://www.weathervane.rff.org/featureslfeature054.html ("Kazakhstan ex-
pressed its intention to join the group of industrialized countries and accept a legally 
binding target."). 
236 The White House Office of the Vice President, Statement by Vice President Gore 
on the Buenos Aires Climate Change Agreement, (Nov. 14, 1998), available at 
http://www.state.gov/www/global/globaUssueslclimatel981114.,gore_climate.html. 
237 Eizenstat COP-4 Press Conference, supra note 209. Eizenstat also noted a 
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ter, perhaps of the same fiber as the fabled Emperor's new 
clothes: Argentina had to strike an item on voluntary commit-
ments for developing countries off the provisional agenda for 
the COP because of overwhelming opposition from other devel-
oping countries. 238 Nevertheless, both Eizenstat and Maria 
Julia Alsogaray, the COP President, asserted that several 
other developing countries had expressed interest in "Argen-
tina's approach."239 
The day before the conference was slated to end, the 
United States signed the Kyoto Protocol.240 This brought the 
number of countries that had signed the Protocol to 60, with 
two having ratified it.241 Republicans attending the meeting in 
Buenos Aires organized a press conference to protest the U.S. 
signature. Senator Chuck Hagel said that "[I]n signing the 
Kyoto Protocol, the President blatantly contradicts the will of 
the US Senate."242 
With the Protocol signed, a schedule established, all op-
tions still on the table, and a door opened for voluntary com-
mitments for developing countries, the U.S. looked to be in 
good shape. But the U.S. still faced opposition from domestic 
constituencies, and the requirement for "meaningful participa-
tion of developing countries" hung like a 100-pound weight 
around U.S. negotiators' necks at the international negotia-
tions. Furthermore, developing countries' demands for access 
to clean technology and to additional financial resources were 
growing stronger with every COP.243 
change in developing countries' views on CDM, specifically mentioning that China and 
several Mrican countries had asked about speeding its implementation. [d. 
238 Summary of the Fourth Conference, supra note 212, at 13. 
239 [d. 
:uo U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Oceans, Environmental and International 
Scientific Affairs, United States Signs the Kyoto Protocol, (Nov. 12, 1998), available at 
http://www.state.gov/www/globaUglobaUssues/climate/fs-us_sign_kyoto_981112.html. 
Signing the agreement does not bind the United States, but it does indicate to other 
countries that the U.S. does intend to ratify the Protocol 
24. [d. 
242 Summary of the Fourth Conference, supra note 212, at 13. 
242 [d. at 14. For an excellent synopsis of issues that remained to be resolved, in-
cluding underlying issues such as equity and a long-term strategy, see Andersen et aI., 
supra note 208. 
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G. 1999: COP-5 AND CONTINUED DOMESTIC RESISTANCE 
In his State of the Union address, Clinton called global 
warming "our most fateful new challenge."244 In February 
1999, the Administration released its proposed budget for Fis-
cal Year 2000 (which would begin October 1999), containing 
$4.1 billion for climate-related policies and programs.245 It was 
a dramatic increase of thirty-four percent from the last year's 
budget. Highlights included a Clean Air Partnerships Fund, 
which would provide grants to state, local and private efforts to 
reduce emissions, continued support for research and develop-
ment on renewable energy and energy efficiency, continued 
... White House Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by 
President William J. Clinton State of the Union Address, (Jan. 19, 1999), available at 
http://clinton6.nara.gov/1999/01l1999-01-19-state-of-the-union-as-prepared-for-
delivery.html. In 1998 and 1999, President Clinton increasingly mentioned climate 
change in his speeches, and in some cases at great length. See, e.g., White House Office 
of the Press Secretary, Statement By the President in Xian, China, (Jan. 27, 2000), 
available at http://clinton6.nara.gov/2000101l2000-01-27-state-of-the-union-address 
.html (describing Million Solar Roofs Initiative); White House Office of the Press Secre-
tary, Radio Address by the President to the Nation, (July 25, 1998), available at 
http://clinton6.nara.gov/1998/07/1998-07-25-radio-address-on-protecting-our-
environment.html (describing new efforts to improve the federal government's effi-
ciency and use of renewable energy); Statement at 150'" Anniversary of the Depart-
ment of the Interior, (Mar. 14, 1999) (asking Interior employees to help the American 
people "get rid of an old, wrong idea" that reducing greenhouse gas emissions will hurt 
the economy); White House Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President 
in the Rose Garden, (June 3, 1999), available at http://clinton6.nara.gov/1999/06/1999-
06-03-statement-by-the-president-on-budget-and-kosovo.html (describing domestic 
efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions); White House Office of the Press Secretary, 
Remarks by the President at Bio-Energy Climate Change Event (Aug. 12, 1999), avail· 
able at http://clinton6.nara.gov/1999/08l1999-08-12-remarks-by-the-president-at-bio-
energy-event.html (discussing how increasing use of bio-energy will help reduce green-
house gas emissions); White House Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the 
President to the People of New Zealand, Antarctic Center, Christchurch, New Zealand, 
(Sept. 15, 1999), available at http://clinton6.nara.gov/1999/09/1999-09-15-remarks-by-
president-to-people-of-new-zealand.html (19 paragraphs on climate change); White 
House Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President to the 54'" Session of the 
United Nations General Assembly (Sept. 21, 1999), available at 
http://clinton6.nara.gov/1999/0911999-09-21-remarks-by-the-president-to-un-general-
assembly.html (discussing need for both developed and developing countries to take 
action on climate change); White House Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the 
President to the Luncheon in Honor of the Ministers Attending the Meetings of the 
World Trade Organization, The Four Seasons Hotel, Seattle, Washington (Dec. 1, 
1999), available at http://clinton6.nara.gov/1999/1211999-12-01-remarks-to-wto-
ministers-at-luncheon-in-seattle.html (7 paragraphs on climate change). 
... Catherine E. Howard, White House Releases FY2000 Climate Change Budget 
Proposal (Feb. 5, 1999) available at http://www.weathervane.rff.org Ifeatures! feature 
058.html. 
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support for research on the science of climate change, support 
for research into forestry and sequestration, and continued 
support for the Climate Change Technology Initiative fIrst an-
nounced in October 1997.246 
Legislation supporting credit for early action gained more 
backers, with President Clinton pledging his full support to 
"work with Congress to reward companies that take early, vol-
untary action to reduce greenhouse gases."247 Senators Chafee, 
Mack and Lieberman in March reintroduced the bill they had 
fIrst introduced in October, modifying it to be a free standing 
law rather than an amendment to the Clean Air Act and 
changing the credit period, as well as incorporating "minor" 
changes requested by environmental and industry groups.248 
In July, Rep. Lazio proposed similar legislation in the House.249 
Notably on the legislative front, several avowed enemies of 
the Kyoto Protocol introduced legislation in the spring of 1999 
proposing "a different course from that of the Kyoto Protocol" 
on energy and climate change.25o Senators Frank Murkowski, 
Chuck Hagel, Robert C. Byrd, and Larry Craig introduced "The 
Energy and Climate Policy Act of 1999," which would create a 
Climate Technology Research, Development and Demonstra-
tion Program costing $200 million annually over the next 10 
years, with private sector contributions, designed to develop 
new technologies to avoid or reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions.251 It also would establish an OffIce of Global Climate 
Change at the Department of Energy, and strengthen the vol-
untary reporting of greenhouse gas reductions under the exist-
~H . 
247 Catherine Howard, Clinton Boosts Senate Bill on Early Emissions Credits in 
State of the Union Address (Jan. 29, 1999), available at http://www.weathervane.rif. 
orgltrading_ postJS2617 _update.html. 
248 Catherine Howard, Senators Reintroduce Legislation for Early Voluntary Green-
house Gas Reductions, (Mar. 16, 1999), available at http://www.weathervane.rif.org 
Itrading_postJS547.htm (S. 547 introduced to replace S.2617). While members of the 
business and environmental community helped craft the bill, support was not unani-
mous; opponents included the National Environmental Trust, the World Wildlife Fund, 
the Competitive Enterprise Institute, and the Small Business Survival Committee, 
among others. Id. 
249 Jennifer B. Thatcher, Early Credit Legislation Introduced in the House, (July 16, 
1999), available at http://www.weathervane.rif.orgifeaturesifeature076.html (discuss-
ing introduction of H.R. 2520). 
2M Marina Cazorla, Senators Introduce The Energy and Climate Policy Act of 1999, 
(Apr. 29, 1999), available at http://www.weathervane.rff.orgifeaturesifeature066.html. 
,.. Id. 
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ing Energy Policy Act section 1605 provisions.252 The bill also 
rejected the implementation of measures to comply with Kyoto 
Protocol emissions reduction assignments until developing 
countries participate in greenhouse gas reductions as called for 
in the Byrd-Hagel Resolution 98.253 Several of the bill's provi-
sions - devoting funds to finding better technology and promot-
ing voluntary reductions - echoed policies of the Clinton Ad-
ministration. Murkowski also stated that he intended to pur-
sue other legislative changes in keeping with Clinton policies, 
such as to promote exports of clean technology and pursue 
changes to the tax code to promote activities that sequestered 
or avoided greenhouse gas emissions.254 Environmental groups 
criticized the bill's continued reliance on voluntary measures as 
opposed to mandatory requirements, as voluntary measures 
taken to date had not slowed emissions growth in the U.S. 
While the groups agreed that increased investment in technol-
ogy was needed for long-term solutions, they also believed that 
more immediate action was required as well. 255 
The Energy and Climate Policy Act of 1999 marked a turn 
in the domestic debate, but not a reversal of position by the 
Kyoto opponents.256 Rather than reject the concept of global 
warming outright, by introducing the Act the Senators ac-
knowledged the need to deal with the issue, but charted a 
slower course, betting on finding technological solutions in the 
long term and relying on voluntary actions in the short term. 





"'" Another example of this turn, but not reversal is the introduction by Senator 
Larry Craig in October of the Climate Change Tax Amendments of 1999 (S.1777) and 
the Climate Change Energy Policy Act (S.1776). S.1777 would have amended the tax 
code to provide credits for research and development into reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions and called for the Secretaries of Energy and Treasury to "jointly study possi-
ble additional incentives" voluntary greenhouse gas reduction expenditures. Jennifer 
B. Thatcher, Sen. Craig Calls for Coordinated Approach to Climate Change Research, 
Policy (Nov. 11, 1999), available at http://www.weathervane.rff.org Ifeatures! fea-
ture082.html. Craig stated that S.1777 should not be confused with the Chafee credit 
for early action bill: "Let's not offer false hope that their [(companies')] efforts will be 
rewarded in some kind of negotiable credits." [d. Early action credits would only have 
value if a domestic or international emissions scheme was enacted; thus, opponents of 
Kyoto viewed credit for early action bills with suspicion. S. 1776 would have made the 
Department of Energy responsible for coordinating climate change policy and research. 
[d. 
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tion's tack was evident at an April 1999 subcommittee hearing 
on the administration's Climate Change Technology Initiative 
(CCTI).257 Congressional representatives claimed that the 
CCTI violated the Knollenberg Amendment by spending money 
on programs that implemented the Kyoto Protocol.258 Admini-
stration officials countered that virtually all the CCTI pro-
grams were expansions or extensions of existing programs and 
not in violation of the amendment.259 Though CCTI did not 
propose mandatory emissions reductions, many members of 
Congress apparently viewed almost any action by the admini-
stration related to climate as "pre-implementation" of Kyoto. 
Senator Murkowski's chief of staff dubbed this "the Kyoto ef-
fect" - programs that Congress usually supported on a biparti-
san basis, such as energy efficiency and renewable energy, 
would now face opposition from members of Congress worried 
that the administration was trying to implement the unratified 
Kyoto Protocol. 260 
1. COP-5: Developing Country Participation 
The ambitious work plan set out at COP-4 kept U.S. nego-
tiators busy, with the U.S. making more than 25 submissions 
to the UNFCCC Executive Secretariat in 1999 prior to Bonn.261 
In May 1999, the EU stated that at least half of its reduction 
commitment would come from domestic emissions reduc-
tions.262 The U.S. said that the EU was "rewriting prior 
agreements" if it intended to require that countries obtain a 
certain percentage of their target from domestic reductions. 
257 Jennifer B. Thatcher, Administration's Climate Budget Request Under Fire (May 
24, 1999), available at http://www.weathervane.rff.orglfeatures/feature069.html. 
258 [d. Representative Knollenberg urged Congress to "remain vigilant in ensuring 
that the Kyoto treaty is not rammed through the backdoor." [d. 
259 [d. Deputy Secretary of Energy T.J. Giauthier, Acting Deputy Director for Man-
agement of the Office of Management and Budget Deirdre Lee, and Assistant Adminis-
trator for Policy of the Environmental Protection Agency David Gardiner testified for 
the administration. [d. 
260 Sally Clarke, Republican, Democratic Staffers Say Kyoto is a No Go, But Action 
on Climate Needed (May 25, 2000), available at http://www.weathervane.rff.org 
IfeatureS/feature098.htmi. 
261 These submissions are listed at http://www.state.gov/www/globaVglobal 
_issues/climate/climate_1999_submiss.html and include submissions of the U.S. as part 
of the Umbrella Group. 
262 Marina Cazorla, After Negotiations, EU Agrees on Common Climate Policy (May 
20, 1999), available at http://www.weathervane.rff.orglfeatures/feature068.html. 
48
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 4 [2002], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol32/iss4/3
2002] CLINTON'S CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY 463 
The U.S. also questioned the EU's motives since the EU coun-
tries had additional flexibility that other countries did not -
they could trade within the EU bubble.263 Clearly the U.S. 
would need to continue to press for the freedom to use the flexi-
bility mechanisms at COP-5.264 
COP-5 took place October 25 - November 5,1999, in Bonn, 
Germany. The U.S. negotiating position going into COP-5 had 
not changed much from COP-4: keep all options on the table, 
keep working hard to resolve issues related to the flexibility 
mechanisms, and keep pushing for developing country partici-
pation.265 While COP-5 continued the forward momentum to 
COP-6, so many issues remained unresolved that the negotia-
tors agreed to double their efforts in the time period leading up 
to COP-6.266 
"" [d. (Comments of Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs Frank Loy). The 
EU bubble refers to the collective commitment by the member countries of the EU to a 
reduction target, which puts the countries to under one "bubble.» The EU had other 
motives as well: 
The Clinton administration also used figures implying that the United States 
could buy from other countries as much as 85 percent of the emissions reductions 
it needed to meet its Kyoto obligations, which would lessen the impact of the 
Kyoto cuts on U.S. businesses and consumers. These purchases could include a 
large quantity of low-cost surplus emissions permits that might be supplied by 
Russia. Other countries, especially several European nations, have denounced 
the U.S. strategy on several grounds. These include fears of lost competitiveness 
vis-a-vis the United States, doubts about the long-term U.S. commitment to re-
ducing greenhouse gases at home, concerns about the integrity of Russian emis-
sions permits, and beliefs that international equity requires domestic sacrifice by 
all developed countries. 
Andersen et aI., supra note 208. 
264 Interestingly, at the time that the EU made this announcement, it admitted that 
it was not on course to meet its Kyoto target. Emissions were projected to rise by 6 
percent from 1990 levels in 2010, while the EU had committed to an 8 percent reduc-
tion. Marina Cazorla, After Negotiations, EU Agrees on Common Climate Policy (May 
20, 1999), available at http://www.weathervane.rff.org/features/feature068.html. 
,.. See, e.g., Press Statement by James P. Rubin, Spokesman for the Department of 
State, Climate Change Conference, (Oct. 26, 1999) available at 
http://secretary.state.gov/wwwlbriefings/statements/1999/ps991026b.html. Sometime 
in this time period (1998-1999), the administration likely decided to delay pushing for 
certain decisions until after the 2000 election. If Gore won, then presumably the ad-
ministration could be more aggressive. Former Acting Assistant Secretary of State for 
Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs Melinda Kimble con-
firmed this impression. Kimble Interview, supra note 38. For this reason, the U.S. also 
pushed for COP-6 to be held in early 2001, rather than in late 2000, but it could not 
convince other countries to go along. See Loy COP-5 Closing Statement, infra note 267. 
266 REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES ON ITS FIFTH SESSION, HELD AT 
BONN FROM 25 OCTOBER TO 5 NOVEMBER 1999, ADDENDUM: PART TwO: ACTION TAKEN 
BY THE CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES AT ITS FIFTH SESSION (Doc. No. 
FCCC/CP/1999/6/Add.1) (Decision lICP.5) (calling on the subsidiary bodies to "intensify 
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Under Secretary of State for Global Mfairs Frank Loy 
sounded positive notes in his closing statement at COP-5: 
We have made significant progress across the full spectrum of 
substantive issues, from emissions trading to sinks to compli-
ance ... Here, we began the hard substantive job of actually 
assembling the very nuts and bolts. We leave Bonn with a 
mandate to negotiate text that will refine these elements and 
weave them into an environmentally strong and economically 
sound agreement. This is absolutely critical. Without these 
buildings blocks, we can not get from Kyoto to a fully opera-
tional, ratifiable Kyoto treaty. 267 
The Parties agreed to work on a single negotiation text on 
the mechanisms that focused on the "principles, modalities, 
rules and guidelines" for operation of the mechanisms, with a 
view to completing work by COP-6.268 Again, this served a key 
objective of the U.S. in bringing the operation of the market 
mechanisms closer to reality.269 The Parties also endorsed a 
work program on sinks designed to resolve key sinks issues by 
COP-6, including definitions of forestry activities under Article 
3.3 as well as additional sinks categories under Article 3.4.270 
While no other developing countries took up the gauntlet 
thrown down by Argentina and Kazakhstan at COP-4, Argen-
tina and Kazakhstan both pressed forward with their commit-
ments. Argentina announced a voluntary binding emissions 
target for 2008-2012, following up on its statement of intention 
at COP_4.271 Kazakhstan formally requested inclusion in An-
their work program" and for the parties to support this effort) [hereinafter COP-5 Ac-
tion Report). 
267 Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs Frank Loy, Closing Statement at 
Fifth Session of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, (Nov. 4, 1999) available at http://www.state.gov/www/policy 
Jemarksl1999/991104_loY31imate.html (hereinafter [Loy COP-5 Closing Statement). 
268 COP-5 Action Report, supra note 266, at Decision 141CP.5. 
268 See, e.g., Loy COP-5 Closing Statement, supra note 267. ("While progress was 
made on all the substantive issues before this Conference, the United States is particu-
larly gratified by the growing recognition that the issue of cost-effectiveness must be 
squarely addressed."). 
270 COP-5 Action Report, supra note 266, at Decision 16/CP.5. See also U.S. De-
partment of State Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific 
Affairs, The Bonn Climate Change Conference: Fact Sheet, (Nov. 1999) (summarizing 
the accomplishments at COP-5 in a more readable form than the Secretariat docu-
ments). 
271 The target picked by Argentina was a two to ten percent reduction below a "busi-
ness-as-usual" scenario in the 2008-2012 period. See Summary of the Fifth Conference 
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nex I of the UNFCCC,272 though action on this request was de-
ferred until COP_B.273 The U.S. called for a "new dialogue" to 
explore the "full range of market-oriented strategies that can 
'create sustainable development opportunities for developing 
countries that voluntarily reduce their emissions."274 
In a development troubling to the Clinton administration, 
the NGO community's campaign to ratify Kyoto by 2002 gained 
increasing recognition at COP-5.275 Setting a deadline for rati-
fication was impolitic for the U.S., since Senate advice and con-
sent is required for ratification. The 2002 date was also pre-
mature until the U.S. could be sure that it would have an 
agreement that could be ratified, which it did not yet. 
H. 2000: FINAL PUSH FOR AN AGREEMENT TO ELABORATE 
RULES FOR KyOTO 
In his State of the Union address, President Clinton de-
voted three paragraphs to topic of global warming, calling it 
"the greatest environmental challenge of the new century."276 
He also stressed that cutting greenhouse gas emissions would 
not slow economic growth; instead, "new technologies make it 
possible to cut harmful emissions and provide even more 
growth."277 The administration's budget for Fiscal Year 2001 
proposed devoting $2.4 billion in funding to combat global cli-
mate change, a forty-three percent increase over enacted levels 
for Fiscal Year 2000.278 In addition to the CCTI, the Clean Air 
Partnership Fund, and other continuing programs, the budget 
included a new International Clean Energy Initiative, which 
of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change October 25 - Novem-
ber 5, 1999, EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULLETIN, Vol. 12, No. 123, Nov. 8, 1999, at 13. Loy 
noted that Argentina's action showed that a developing country "can fashion a target 
that benefits the environment while contributing to its sustainable development." Loy 
COP-5 Closing Statement, supra note 267. 
2'12 The result of which would put it in the same category as developed countries. 
273 COP-5 Action Report, supra note 266, at § II, para. 4. 
274 Loy COP-5 Closing Statement, supra note 267. 
27& See Summary of the Fifth Conference of the Parties, supra note 271, at 15. 
276 White House Office of the Press Secretary, President William J. Clinton State of 
the Union Address, (Jan. 27, 2000), available at http://clinton6.nara.gov/2000/01/2000-
01-27-state-of-the-union-address.html. 
m [d. (emphasis in the original). CCTI was designed to spur development and 
adoption of these technologies. 
278 UNITED STATES: DOMESTIC PROGRESS ON CLIMATE CHANGE, at 4 (Nov. 2000) 
(part of press packet handed out at COP-6). 
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would devote $201 million to help accelerate the deployment of 
clean energy technologies around the world.279 
But the Administration's perennial push for increased 
funding for climate change actions faced the usual opposition 
on the Hill. The House Subcommittee on National Economic 
Growth, Natural Resources and Regulatory Mfairs requested 
that the Energy Information Administration (EIA) analyze how 
much CCTI would reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and EIA 
released its report in May 2000 concluding that the tax incen-
tives would have only a relatively small effect.280 Republicans 
pushed for alternative bills, the Energy and Climate Policy Act 
of 1999 (S. 882),281 and the Climate Change Energy Policy Re-
sponse Act of 1999 (S.1776).282 The Administration opposed 
centralizing authority for climate change in the Department of 
Energy since it needed the expertise of many agencies in ad-
dressing climate change, and said that the bills duplicated ex-
isting programs and did not provide a complete strategy.283 
But as these Republican bills suggested, the opposition on 
the Hill was mainly to the Kyoto Protocol rather than question-
ing the science of climate change or the need to take some ac-
tion on climate change. Senator Murkowski's chief of staff 
pointed to flaws he saw in the Protocol- too short term, drafted 
without the input of the Senate, imposing economic pain with-
out environmental gain, and failure to include all countries, but 
he also said that these flaws do "not absolve us from trying to 
resolve the underlying problem."284 
2'/9 Id. at 5. 
280 Jennifer B. Thatcher, EIA Analysis Reveals CCTI Will Have Small Impact on 
Emissions (May 11, 2000), available at http://www.weathervane.riT.org 
IfeatureS/feature096.html. EIA concluded that the tax incentives would reduce carbon 
emissions by 1.3 million metric tons in 2010-0nly 0.07 percent below baseline projec-
tions for that year as estimated in the Annual Energy Outlook 2000. Id. It said that 
the short duration of the incentives was a factor in keeping the impact small. EIA also 
said that it was difficult to quantify the emissions impact of the $1.4 billion proposed 
for research and development (R&D). Id. See Energy Information Administration, 
Analysis of the Climate Change Technology Initiative (CCT!): Fiscal Year 2001, (May 
2000), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaflclimate. 
281 See description supra. 
282 See description supra. 
283 Jennifer Lee, Senate Committee Hears Testimony on Climate Change Bills (April 
4, 2000), available at http://www.weathervane.rfT.org/features/feature092.html.By 
centralizing all climate change programs in one agency, it would also be easier to track 
spending, cut spending and oversee administration action on climate. 
... Sally Clarke, Republican, Democratic Staffers Say Kyoto is a No Go, But Action 
on Climate is Needed (May 25, 2000), available at http://www.weathervane.riT.org 
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A major U.S. scientific report underscored the need to take 
action on climate change, finding that climate change could 
cause serious harm to the United States. In June, the U.S. 
Global Change Research Program released the first national 
assessment of the possible effects of global warming on various 
regions in the United States.285 The study found that if global 
temperatures continued to rise at current levels, the United 
States "may experience substantial consequences in coming 
decades, including higher crop production, increased erosion of 
coasts, extreme dry and wet conditions, and disproportionately 
hotter urban areas."286 Hundreds of leading scientists partici-
pated in the effort, which included 20 regional workshops, and 
the draft report was peer-reviewed by independent scientists. 287 
The document received widespread attention in the press288 
and underscored the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
to avert the harmful impacts to the U.S. outlined in the re-
port.289 In another relatively positive announcement, draft fig-
ures from the Environmental Protection Agency showed a 
modest one-half percent growth in U.S. greenhouse gas emis-
sion in 1999.290 This growth was significantly lower than the 
average growth rate of 1.3 percent in 1990 through 1998. How-
/featureslfeature098.html. 
... Sally Clarke, First National Assessment Projects Major Climate Change Effects 
Across the U.S. (June 13, 2000). The assessment was called for by a 1990 federal law 
and was written by the National Assessment Synthesis Team (NAST), a committee of 
experts drawn from governments, universities, industry, and non-governmental or-
ganizations. NATIONAL AsSESSMENT SYNTHESIS TEAM, U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE 
RESEARCH PROGRAM, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON THE UNITED STATES: THE 
POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF CLIMATE VARIABILITY AND CHANGE: OVERVIEW REPORT 
(December 2000), available at http://www.gcrio.org/NationalAssessmentl or 
http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edulNationalAssessment. NAST also produced a longer 
"Foundation Report." 
286 Clarke, supra note 285. 
"" [d. 
288 See, e.g., Curt Suplee, Drastic Climate Changes Forecast; Global Warming Likely 
to Cause Droughts, Coastal Erosion in U.S., Report Says, WASH. POST, June 12,2000, 
at A3; H. Josef Hebert, Rising Temps Forecast Changes, AsSOCIATED PRESS, June 6, 
200); Forecast for 2100: Hotter, USA TODAY, June 13,2000, at 4A. 
288 For example, the report said that sugar maples could disappear from New Eng-
land, and some coastal cities, faced with sea level rise and more frequent storm surges, 
may have to redesign and adapt water, sewer and transportation systems. Hebert, 
supra note 288. The risk of drought in the Midwest is substantial. Suplee, supra note 
288. 
200 Jennifer B. Thatcher, 11.5% Increase in US GHG Emissions Since 1990, EPA 
Says (Mar. 8, 2000), available at http://www.weathervane.rff.org/ featureslfeature089. 
html. 
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However, EPA attributed this drop to a relatively mild winter, 
and U.S. total emissions were still increasing - now 11.5 per-
cent above emissions in 1990. 
As usual, the European Union announced the positions it 
would espouse at the next Conference of Parties, COP-6, well 
before the meetings. In June, the EU ministers agreed to take 
a hard line position on sinks: additional sinks and sources un-
der Articles 3.3 and 3.4 should not be included until after the 
fIrst commitment period and sinks projects should not be al-
lowed to qualify for the Clean Development Mechanism.291 The 
EU stated that there should be "strict consequences for non-
compliance" with the Kyoto Protocol, including loss of eligibility 
to use the flexibility mechanisms and tough fInancial penal-
ties.292 It also reaffirmed its commitment to create "the condi-
tions for ratifIcation and entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol 
by 2002 at the latest."293 
The U.S. approach on sinks and compliance was markedly 
different from the ED's, especially with respect to sinks. In 
August, the U.S. submitted its views to the UNFCCC Secre-
tariat concerning the role sinks should play in the Kyoto Proto-
co1.294 It advocated a comprehensive approach based on sound 
science that would provide strong incentives for sound man-
agement of carbon stocks.295 In particular, the U.S. supported 
inclusion of broad land management categories together with 
comprehensive greenhouse gas accounting.296 The U.S. indi-
cated it was willing to consider a "phase-in" for the fIrst com-
mitment period so that only a portion of sinks would be cred-
ited during this period "to address the concerns of some coun-
tries about the effect of comprehensive greenhouse gas account-
291 Jennifer B. Thatcher, EU Adopts Strong Stance on Sinks and Compliance (June 




294 United States Submission to UNFCCC on Land-Use, Land-Use Change, and 
Forestry, (Aug. 1, 2000), available at http://www.state.gov/www/globallglobal 
_issues/climate/OOOBO CunfcccCsubm. pdf. 
... See Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, 
U.S. Department of State, U.S. Views on Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forests, 
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ing on the fIrst budget period targets."297 In other words, 
unlike the EU, the U.S. supported inclusion of broad categories 
of sinks activities, but it recognized that this approach could 
result in large sinks credits in the fIrst budget period and so 
was willing to consider accepting partial credit for sinks in the 
fIrst period. Presumably in subsequent budget periods, parties 
would factor in sinks credits into their targets, so such a phase-
in would not be necessary after the fIrst period. The submis-
sion did not address sinks in the CDM. The U.S. also sup-
ported a strong compliance regime, but rather than paying fI-
nancial penalties, parties in violation should be required to 
"make up" the tons they had missed, with additional penalty 
tons. This would "make the atmosphere whole, and thereby 
help improve the environment."298 
At the meetings of the subsidiary bodies in Lyon in Sep-
tember, sinks, supplementarity,299 and the CDM dominated 
discussions. 30o The Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Techno-
logical Advice adopted a text laying out options on sinks for the 
parties to decide upon at COP-6, but there was little agreement 
among the groups to narrow the options down.301 The EU con-
tinued to insist that parties achieve most of their emissions 
reductions domestically, and the EU and the U.S. differed on 
whether CDM projects should be limited to a "positive" list 
(ED) or whether developing countries, which would host such 
projects, should be free to select CDM projects appropriate to 
their circumstances (U.S.).302 With only two months remaining 
until COP-6, the Lyon meetings left many crucial issues to be 
resolved, so the UNFCCC planned numerous informal consul-
tations.303 
A week after the Lyon meetings, the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions and Energy and Natural Resources Committees held a 
297 [d. 
298 Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and 
Scientific Affairs David B. Sandalow, Statement at Thirteenth Sessions of the Subsidi-
ary Bodies, Framework Convention on Climate Change, (Sept. 14, 2000), available at 
http://www.state.gov/www/policy _remarks/2000/000914_sandalow _lyon.html. 
299 The term "supplementarity" refers to the issue of how much of their emissions 
commitments did Annex I parties need to achieve at home. 
,.,. Jennifer Lee, The 13'h Sessions of the Subsidiary Bodies Conclude Talks in Lyon 
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joint hearing to discuss the U.S. position at the upcoming COP-
6 negotiations. Under Secretary of State for Global Mairs 
Frank Loy testified for the administration, stating that three 
fundamental issues needed to be addressed at the upcoming 
negotiations: environmental effectiveness, economic cost, and 
developing country participation. 304 
• Environmental effectiveness. The U.S. would continue to 
"[take] the lead in developing comprehensive, effective, and 
binding rules to estimate, report and review emissions, and 
to track trading."305 The U.S. would also continue to sup-
port legally binding consequences for exceeding targets.306 
• Economic cost. To promote cost-effective action, the U.S. 
would seek to ensure that "the Kyoto [flexibility] mecha-
nisms and the Protocol's sinks provisions can be imple-
mented as simply as possible, while preserving the envi-
ronmental integrity of the Protocol."307 The U.S. would re-
sist efforts to put a cap on the ability of a Party to use the 
mechanisms. 308 On sinks, as noted above, the U.S. would 
support a comprehensive, broad-based accounting system 
and broad inclusion of sinks activities, with a phase-in for 
the fIrst budget period.309 Senator Murkowski questioned 
whether cost-effective action under Kyoto was possible, cit-
ing the 1998 EIA study fInding that Americans could face 
gas prices fIfty-three percent higher if Kyoto went into ef-
fect. 3lO Loy noted that the EIA study did not factor in emis-
sions trading or sinks, which would reduce the costS.3ll 
• Developing country participation. Loy noted that key de-
veloping countries needed to join the fIght against climate 
change, but he did not indicate in his statement what the 
304 Statement of Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs Frank E. Loy before the 
U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Energy and Natu-
ral Resources, (Sept. 28, 2000), auailable at http://www.state.gov/www/policy_ re-






310 Jennifer Lee, Senate Committees Hold Joint Hearing on Status of Kyoto Negotia-
tions (Sept. 29, 2000), auailable at http://www.weathervane.rff.orglnegtable/ JointHear-
ing.html !hereinafter Pre-COP-6 Senate Hearing Article). 
311 [d. 
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U.S. strategy at COP-6 would be. Instead, he noted the pro-
gress the U.S. had made in engaging developing countries: 
• Argentina had announced a national emissions tar-
get, and "Kazakhstan and Bolivia have announced a 
willingness to do the same."312 
• In March, the U.S. and India signed a joint state-
ment on cooperation on energy and environment is-
sues.313 In this statement, India "outlined" two goals: 
that ten percent of its new electric power would come 
from renewable energy sources by 2012, and that it will 
improve energy efficiency in power production by 15% 
by 2007-2008.314 
• In May, the U.S. and China signed a joint statement 
on environmental cooperation, committing to further 
ongoing cooperation to address global environmental 
challenges, including climate change.315 Loy noted that 
China had opposed international dialogue regarding 
developing countries taking action on climate change, 
so this represented a "new openness to engagement."316 
• Loy also reported that developing countries now evi-
denced "genuine and enthusiastic support" for the 
CDM.317 
312 Loy Pre-COP-6 Senate Statement, supra note 304. 
471 
3.3 White House Office of the Press Secretary, Joint U.S.-India Statement, (Mar. 21, 
2000), available at http://clinton6.nara.gov/2000/03/2000-03-21-joint-us-and-india-
statement.html. 
314 White House Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet on President Clinton's 
India Trip: Protecting the Environment, Promoting Clean Energy Development and 
Combating Global Warming, (Mar. 22, 2000), available at 
http://clinton6.nara.gov/2000103/2000-03-22-fact-sheet-on-protecting-the-environment-
and-clean-energy.html. The U.S. would help in this effort in part by providing $45 
million through the U.S. Agency for International Development to promote energy 
efficiency use and production in India, and $50 million to promote clean energy 
throughout South Asia. [d. 
316 White House Office of the Vice President, Joint Statement on Cooperation [sic] 
Environment & Development Between the United States and China, (May 19, 2000), 
available at http://clinton6.nara.gov/2000/05/2000-05-19-statement-on-cooperation-
between-united-states-and-china.html. 
316 Loy Pre-COP6 Senate Statement, supra note 304. 
317 [d. Energy efficiency and clean energy projects under the CDM will help develop-
ing countries reduce their emissions growth. 
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Loy concluded that the U.S. anticipated "that many of 
these highly complex issues [would] come to a head at The 
Hague [COP-6]."318 This was an understatement: as the Lyon 
meetings had shown, the EU and U.S. differed sharply on a 
number of issues, and the G-77/China countries had their own 
agenda to pursue regarding financial resources and technology 
transfer, and would likely suspect U.S. overtures would be 
linked to taking on an emissions reduction commitment. 
And, in a development expected by none, no clear victor 
emerged from the U.S. Presidential election.319 U.S. negotia-
tors left for The Hague unsure whether the next President 
would be a Democratic or a Republican. While U.S. negotiators 
believed that environmental integrity, cost effective action and 
developing country participation were principles both parties 
would support, clearly they would be disadvantaged in negotia-
tions with other countries when countries would wonder if the 
as-yet unknown U.S. President would support any deal struck 
at The Hague. 
1. COP-6: EU-US Disagreement over Sinks Scuttles Deal 
The purpose of COP-6 was to work out rules to implement 
the vague language of the Kyoto Protocol so that countries 
would be able to ratify it.320 Thus, expectations for the meeting 
were high. However, ministers arrived the second week of 
COP-6 for the high-level negotiations portion of the COP with a 
full plate of issues remaining.321 In hopes of moving the nego-
tiations along, Dutch Environment Minister Jan Pronk, the 
chair of COP-6 created four "contact" groups322 to deal with the 
318 Id. 
819 Ron Fournier, Bush, Gore Locked in Close Contest, AsSOCIATED PRESS 
NEWSWIRE, Nov. 8, 2000 (describing how Gore called to concede to Bush on election 
night when the networks called Florida for Bush but then retracted his concession 
when it was not clear who had won Florida); Peter Slevin, Bush's Florida Lead Shrinks 
to 300 Justification Required on Recounts In Media Spotlight, Recount Staggers On, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2000, at Al (vote recount in Florida still leaves race undecided). 
Gore finally conceded on December 13, 2000, after an unfavorable ruling from the 
Supreme Court regarding the recount of votes in Florida. Ron Fournier, Gore Con-
cedes, Bush Calls for Unity, AsSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRE, Dec. 13, 2000. 
820 See, e.g., John W. Anderson, Opening Moves in the Hague (Nov. 14, 2000), avail-
able at http://www.weathervane.riT.org/featureslfeature109.html. 
821 See EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULLETIN, Vol. 12, No. 163, Nov. 27, 2000, at 1. 
822 Contact groups are smaller groups than the plenary sessions, which include all 
countries. 
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following issues: developing country issues;323 mechanisms;324 
sinks issues;325 and compliance and accounting.326 This allowed 
delegates to consider crosscutting issues within the groups, and 
thus could then hopefully facilitate negotiations. However, by 
Thursday, Nov. 23, negotiations appeared stalled. 
With the media reporting a severe lack of progress at the 
negotiations, activist groups became increasingly concerned 
that the parties would be unable to reach agreement.327 From 
the start of the meeting, environmental groups and the press 
had consistently criticized the U.S. for purportedly advocating 
the use of "loopholes."328 The EU did not move much from its 
opening positions on sinks,329 while the U.S. showed flexibility 
on a number of issues in hopes of reaching an agreement, in-
cluding sinks, CDM, the participation of developing coun-
tries,330 and a new fund for developing countries. 331 Neverthe-
323 Capacity building, technology transfer and funding. 
... Emissions trading, the clean development mechanisms and joint implementation . 
... Land-use, land-use changes and forestry . 
• 26 EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULLETIN, supra note 321. 
S27 See, e.g., UN Climate Conference Quotes: Pain, Gain, and Turkeys, AGENCE FR. 
PRESSE ENGLISH WIRE, Nov. 23, 2000 (quoting Greenpeace saying that the next 48 
hours would determine the fate of the Kyoto Protocol, and it could be saved if the U.S. 
and Japan would show leadership rather than "leading the race to cheat their way out 
of action"). 
328 Every day in their briefmgs, spokespersons for the NGOs reportedly criticized the 
behavior of the U.S. C. Gerald Fraser, Activists: Coming of Age, EARTH TIMES, Nov. 24, 
2000, at 6. World Wildlife Fund (WWF) campaigner Jennifer Morgan criticized the 
U.S. position on sinks "at practically every news briefing WWF was involved in." Id. 
The U.S. Public Interest Group accused the U.S. of trying to "take credit for doing 
nothing." Id. See also, e.g., Alex Kirby, Protests Fail to Derail Climate Talks, BBC 
NEWS ONLINE, Nov. 22, 2000, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uklhilenglish/sciltech/newsid_1036000/1036211.stm(theU.S.is 
"seen here by many other delegations, and by most environmental campaigners, as so 
wedded to the protection of its own narrow short-term interests that the chasm sur-
rounding it is now almost unbridgeable"). The European press in particular challenged 
the U.S. position. See, e.g, Press Briefing by Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans 
and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES) David Sandelow et aI., 
(Nov. 13, 2000), available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/global _issues/climate 
/cop6/cop6_11-13-0Opb.html (Reuters reporter asks whether "the U.S. trying to dodge 
its political burden by trying not to take any domestic measures and do you think there 
should be a cap on the flexible mechanisms?"). 
329 See, e.g., Robin Pomeroy, U.S. Says Chirac Pollution Attack Unhelpful, REUTERS 
ONLINE, Nov. 20, 2000 (EU remains opposed to the U.S. sinks position). 
S30 See Press Briefing by Under Secretary of Secretary of State for Global Affairs and 
Head of the U.S. Delegation Frank E. Loy et aI., (Nov. 21, 2000), available at 
http://www.state.govlwww/global/global_issueS/climate/cop6/cop6_11-21-00pb.html 
(stating that "the United States has shown considerable flexibility in a number of the 
positions we have taken" during COP-6: the U.S. was not going to seek targets from 
developing countries, was proposing a phase-in period for sinks, was adopting a differ-
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less, protesters appeared to blame mainly the U.S. for the ap-
parent lack of progress. Tensions at the conference finally 
boiled over on Wednesday of the second week. Protesters 
threw a pie in the face of the chief U.S. negotiator Frank Loy332 
and a group of 40 protesters "stormed" into a meeting room and 
used noisemakers to disrupt the session; ten of the protesters 
sat down in the room, locked arms and refused to leave.333 
Late Thursday evening, with one official day left in the 
conference, Pronk issued a paper (the "Pronk paper")334 that he 
called a "balanced package"335 outlining his proposals on key 
issues in an attempt to reach consensus. 336 Rather than focus-
ent definition for forests under Article 3.3 in order to avoid incentives for deforestation, 
was considering a preference for small projects in the COM, and was willing to discuss 
whether nuclear projects should be allowed in the COM.) On sinks, the U.S. modified 
its proposal so that fewer sink tons would count in the first budget period. As de-
scribed by Loy, the U.S. proposal would allow countries to "fully count as a first inter-
val not more than 20 million metric tons of annual carbon sequestration in managed 
forests. In addition, currently projected sequestration beyond that level would be dis-
counted by two-thirds." Press Briefing by Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs 
and Head of the U.S. Delegation Frank E. Loy et. aI., (Nov. 20, 2000), available at 
http://www.state.gov/www/global/globaUssues/climate/cop6/cop6_11-20-00pb.html. 
331 US Sees New Climate Fund for Poor as Deadline Looms at UN Talks, AGENCE FR. 
PRESSE ENGLISH WIRE, Nov. 23, 2000 (U.S., Japan and Canada propose new $1 billion 
fund to help developing countries combat climate change). 
332 Loy, the consummate diplomat and good sport, later issued a statement saying 
that, "On the eve of Thanksgiving, pumpkin pie would have been a more traditional 
choice, but what I really want is a strong agreement to fight global warming." Kirby, 
supra note 328. 
333 John A. Dillon and Jennifer Morrow, Protests Disrupt Conference; Delegates 
Struggle to Complete Negotiations in Uncertain Mood - Pie Hurled at Loy; Negotiations 
Slow, EARTH TIMES, Nov. 23, 2000, at 12. The protesters said the "delegates were 
catering to corporate lobbyists rather than pushing for drastic cuts in greenhouse 
gases" the protesters thought were needed. [d. There were also numerous peaceful 
protests, demonstrations and expressions of opinion, including the construction of a 
"dike" around the conference center, World Wildlife Fund members dressed in polar 
bears, the construction of ice sculptures, and the usual "Fossil of the Day" awards by 
the CAN. See, e.g., "Demonstrators build sand barrier at UN conference," Agence 
France Presse English Wire, (Nov. 18, 2000); Richard Ingham, Guerrillas in Our Midst: 
Green Protest Permeates Climate Talks, AGENCE FR. PRESSE ENGLISH WIRE, Nov. 22, 
2000 (describing the "street theatre" of the protesters at the talks). 
334 REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES ON THE FIRST PART OF ITS SIXTH 
SESSION, HELD AT THE HAGUE FROM 13 TO 25 NOVEMBER 2000 ADDENDUM PART TwO: 
ACTION TAKEN BY THE CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES AT THE FIRST PART OF ITS SIXTH 
SESSION (Doc. No. FCCC/CP/2000/5/Add.2) (Apr. 4, 2001) [hereinafter COP-6 REPORT], 
(Annex to Decision lICP.6 titled "Note by the President of the Conference of the Parties 
at its sixth session, dated 23 November 2000"). 
336 Malini Goel and Rabya Nizam, Pronk's Plan - Negotiators Unable to Complete 
Work but Officials Warn that Climate Conference May not be Extended: Analysis: Clock 
Ticks for Hague Agreement, EARTH TIMES, Nov. 24, 2000. 
336 EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULLETIN, supra note 321, at 1. 
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ing on the work of the four contact groups, all attention then 
turned to the Pronk paper. It quickly became clear that the 
paper's suggested compromises would not be accepted by the 
parties in the time remaining.337 
In hopes of salvaging some result from the process, the 
European Union and the Umbrella Group then met separately 
to try to reach agreement on three key issues: supplementarity, 
sinks and compliance.338 In the early hours of Saturday morn-
ing, several members of the EU, including Minister Voynet, 
and members of the Umbrella Group shook hands on an 
agreement. But when this group went to present the agree-
ment to the whole EU, it was rejected, reportedly because some 
of the EU members not present at the negotiations with the 
Umbrella Group could not accept the number of sinks tons al-
lowed.339 Later that afternoon a subdued and disconsolate 
Pronk declared that the parties were unable to reach agree-
ment.340 The parties adopted a decision to suspend COP-6: it 
337 [d. at 18 (reviewing Pronk's paper and offering its views on how parties would 
object to his suggested solutions). Environmental groups thought the Pronk paper 
reflected mainly the U.S. positions and thus was completely unacceptable. Climate 
Action Network, EU: Salvage Your Dignity! ECO, Vol. 105, No. 12, Nov. 24, 2000, 
available at http://www.climatenetwork.org/eco/eco12_1100.html.InCAN·sview. 
Pronk's paper contained "a huge free gift" to the U.S. on sinks, no restrictions on emis-
sions trading and thus could promote the trading of "hot air" from Russia, weak com-
pliance measures and inadequate controls on the types of projects in the COM. See 
Climate Action Network, No to A License To Emit - Yes to Action, ECO, Vol. 105, No. 
12, Nov. 24, 2000, available at http://www.state.govlwww/globallgloba 
Ussueslclimatelcop6l001124_loY30p6.html. However, the U.S. said it was "deeply 
disappointed" with the Pronk paper and considered it "unacceptably imbalanced." 
Statement of Under Secretary for Global Mfairs and Head of U.S. Delegation Frank E. 
Loy, Nov. 24, 2000, available at http://www.state.govlwww/globallglobal 
_issues/climate/cop6/001124_loy _cop6.html. 
338 These were considered "developed country" issues (i.e., not the COM or financial 
resources or technology transfer), but the EU and the Umbrella Group were criticized 
for excluding developing countries from the discussion, since developing countries had 
a stake in the outcome. As reported in the Earth Negotiations Bulletin: 
Much of the media's coverage on the collapse of the talks has focused on the ap-
parent inability of the EU and US to reach a compromise on sinks and supple-
mentarity. However, to imagine that agreement on these issues alone would have 
saved the talks in the last hour is to make the arrogant - and mistaken - as-
sumption that this would have proved acceptable to the G-77/China. Not only 
does the Group have its own strong position on these issues, but there were also 
a number of unresolved differences on concerns of particular importance to the 
Group: funding and adverse effects, technology transfer and adaptation under 
theUNFCCC. 
Earth Negotiations Bulletin, supra note 321, at 18. 
339 [d. 
340 REpORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES ON THE FIRST PART OF ITS SIXTH 
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stated that the COP decides to suspend its 6th session and it 
further requested Pronk to "seek advice on the desirability of 
resuming that session in May/June 2001."341 Pronk's paper, 
the texts from the COP-6, and the texts from the Lyon sessions 
were all forwarded to the resumed session.342 
Despite acrimonious public statements pinpointing the 
blame on each other for the failure at the Hague,343 the EU and 
some members of the Umbrella Group met in early December 
in Ottawa to try to resuscitate the "almost" agreement of Sat-
urday morning.344 They were not successful,345 
Why weren't parties able to strike a deal at COP-6? The 
EU certainly wanted an agreement in order to stay on track 
with its goal of ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by 2002, and 
the U.S. negotiators likely wanted to end the Clinton admini-
stration on a successful note. One of the chief negotiators for 
the U.S. remarked that "some countries have viewed this 
agreement as more narrowly focusing on reducing emissions 
from the industrial sector and other countries have tended to 
view this as an agreement focused on fighting global warming." 
SESSION, HELD AT THE HAGUE FROM 13 TO 25 NOVEMBER 2000 PART ONE: 
PROCEEDINGS (Doc. No. FCCC/CP/2000/5/Add.1) (April 4, 2001,) at § XI.B.2 (para. 
113). See also EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULLETIN, supra note 321, at 18. (At the Informal 
High-Level Plenary Saturday afternoon, Pronk expressed "his disappointment" that no 
agreement had been reached and that the "expectations of the 'outside world' had not 
been met"). 
341 COP-6 REPORT, supra note 334, at Decision lICP.6. 
342 [d. See also Doc. No. FCCC/CP/2000/5/Add.3 (texts from COP-6) and Doc. No. 
FCCC/CP/2000IINF.3 (texts from Lyon). 
... See, e.g., Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs Frank E. Loy, Statement to 
the Sixth Session of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (COP 6); The Hague, Netherlands, (Nov. 25, 2000), available at 
http://www.state.gov/www/policYJemarksl2000/001125_loy_cop6.html) (while not 
naming the EU, it is clear that Loy is referring to the EU when he says that too many 
of the parties held fast to "positions shaped more by political purity, than practicality; 
more by dogmatism, than pragmatism"), Jeremy Lennard, Bitter Recriminations Fly 
After UN Climate Talks Flop, AGENCE FR. PRESSE ENGLISH WIRE, Nov. 26, 2000 
(French Environment Minister Voynet says U.S. demanded too many concessions; 
London Observer criticized the US for "apparently believ[ing] it should come under no 
scrutiny for running its own industry with inefficient, environmentally damaging tech-
nologies long abandoned by Europe"); UN Climate Conference President Says EU Also 
to Blame for Failure, AGENCE FR. PRESSE ENGLISH WIRE, Nov. 26, 2000 (Pronk says 
EU began too late to negotiate). There was also finger pointing within the EU. 
... Howard Williams, Top Environment Bureaucrats Meet in Secret, Hope to Kick· 
Start Climate Talks, AGENCE FR. PRESSE ENGLISH WIRE, Dec. 6, 2000 . 
... Xinhua Asia World sources, Inc., No Ministerial Climate Talks for Now, 
AsSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRE, Dec. 8, 2000 (quoting EU official saying that "some 
progress was made at the meeting, but a lot still remained to be done"). 
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In other words, the ED's positions on sinks, supplementarity 
and the CDM were aimed at forcing countries to achieve most 
of their reductions domestically, while the U.S. wanted to make 
use of every tool it could, including sinks and emissions reduc-
tions abroad.346 With such radically different views, could 
agreement have been achieved? And when one throws the 
financial and technology transfer demands of the G-77 /China 
countries into the mix,347 the prospects for agreement seem 
even more ephemeral. 
III. CONCLUSION 
In the end, the gap between domestic and international 
viewpoints was too wide for the Clinton administration to 
bridge. Powerful domestic constituencies were concerned about 
the economic cost of reducing emissions and the lack of devel-
oping country participation, while foreign negotiators were 
more concerned with tamping down the U.S. economy (and con-
comitant large greenhouse gas emissions) and providing finan-
cial resources to developing countries. Also, Clinton's compro-
mised position (adopted to help secure broader support) cost 
him the support of many U.s. environmental groups. The Clin-
ton administration was unable to "make good" on its ambitious 
commitment at Kyoto to reduce emissions. Nevertheless, the 
scientific evidence of the negative impacts of global warming 
continues to mount, 348 and the rest of the world is moving for-
ward on implementing the Kyoto Protocol. 349 As the largest 
... See also Loy Statement, supra note 243 (stating the U.So's deep disappointment 
that no agreement was reached and appearing to put much of the blame for the failure 
on the EU). 
347 At COP-6 the United States and other members of the Umbrella Group did pro-
pose a new fund of $1 billion over 5 years to help developing countries, but "there was 
no closure on the details." John W. Anderson, Why the Climate Change Conference 
Failed: An Analysis (Dec. 4, 2000), available at http://www.weathervane.riI.org 
Inegtable/COP6/analysis_anderson.htm. 
... Odile Meuvret, Global Warming Crisis Worse Than Thought: UN Report, AGENCE 
FR. PRESSE ENGLISH WIRE, Nov. 2, 2000 (draft Third Assessment Report by the IPCC 
warns that global warming will be worse than thought). 
34. See, e.g., Eric Pianin, Warming Pact a Win for European Leackrs; Negotiators 
Rally Global Community but Say Impact May Be Modest Without U.S. Role, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 11, 2001, at A2 (COP-7 in Marrakesh results in an agreement paving the 
way for ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, but the U.S. is not a party to this agreement 
as President Bush in March said he would not submit the Protocol to the Senate for 
ratification). 
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greenhouse gas emitter, the U.S. needs to be a part of the 
global solution. But what mix of policies will .!Jlay on both the 
domestic and international fronts? Ay, there's the rub. 
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